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This project investigates how the United States Information Agency (USIA) 
functioned as a propaganda machine on behalf of the United States government at the 
dawn of the Cold War and the Civil Rights Movement. Drawing from literature on 
propaganda, public relations, and public diplomacy, this thesis connects 20th century 
American propaganda to its roots in public relations, communication studies, and 
psychology.  
The Civil Rights movement exposed the cultural inertia of white supremacy in 
America for the world to see while American foreign policy makers sought to crystallize 
a cultural hegemony fashioned after American political, cultural, and economic systems. 
Although the cultural and political systems in America were in a state of radical flux as 
the Cold War and the Civil Rights movements affected one another. Thus, as the voice of 
America abroad, USIA was pushed to negotiate the psychological and cultural tensions 
experienced in America for foreign audiences. 
 Using a discursive constructivist methodology, this study explores how American 
Cold War propaganda was developed by USIA to tell America’s story abroad. By 
critically examining USIA’s actions between 1953-1965 this study explores how USIA 
framed the image of the American race relations at the nexus of the Cold War and the US 
Civil Rights Movement. By analyzing propaganda disseminated by USIA regarding civil 
rights, examining US national security reports, US State Department memos, and 
supporting national intelligence community documents this project aims to answer the 
following research questions: RQ 1: How did the USIA frame the American race  
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relations throughout the Campaign for Truth?, RQ 2: How did USIA bolster US 
prestige/soft power from 1953-1963?. RQ 3: How did USIA use communication and 
public relations to effectively mask the ugliness of the Civil Rights Movement? 
American propaganda integrated new forms of mass media communications 
technology with a sophisticated variety of strategies and tactics to manipulate public 
opinion around the world. Blending traditional message broadcasting with interpersonal 
forms of advocacy (cultural exchanges) in imaginative campaigns which coopted the 




Chapter 1: Image of a Nation: Jim Crow Propaganda 
“We must make ourselves known as we really are—not as Communist propaganda 
pictures us. We must pool our efforts with those of other free peoples in a sustained, 
intensified program to promote the cause of freedom against the propaganda of slavery. 
We must make ourselves heard round the world in a Great Campaign of Truth.”- 
President Truman to the American Society of Newspaper Editors (1950) 
The quote above captured the ideological motivation spurring political and social 
tension in the United States during the Cold War era inspiring the “Great Campaign of 
Truth.” A political gamble for cultural hegemony in the geopolitical system. President 
Truman articulated an implied moral dichotomy between the “freedom” inextricably 
linked with American democratic capitalism and the “slavery” tethered to Soviet 
authoritarian communism. In this context, slavery referred to the perceived loss of 
personal freedom to a totalitarian government dictating how individuals ought to live. 
Consequently, efforts to control the ideological structure of 20th century modernization 
accompanied a cultural contest for geopolitical power. This historical period looms in the 
memory of American citizens as an era marked by nuclear brinkmanship, containment 
policies, ideological propaganda, and complicated diplomatic engagements between the 
United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR). At the same time, a powerful surge of 
international decolonization movements facilitated a flux in global power dynamics. This 
culmination of events catalyzed the development of modern mass media propaganda to 
influence public opinion in the burgeoning “Free World.” 
Running parallel to the Cold War, an incendiary Civil Rights Movement spanning 
approximately 1954-1968 complicates the historical legacy of this period. America’s 
international image was being tainted by international attention to viral news coverage 
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highlighting violent racial discrimination (Dudziak, 1988, p. 62). Furthermore Dudziak 
(1988) notes that: 
the focus of American foreign policy at this point was to promote democracy and 
to ‘contain’ Communism. However, the international focus on US racial problems 
signified [that] the image of American democracy was tarnished. (p. 62)  
US vulnerability to moral critiques were readily appropriated into Soviet propaganda. 
According to Hixon (1998) “[t]he propaganda problem in which Americans found 
themselves most vulnerable in the developing world was racism in the United States,” as 
the Soviets highlighted “discrimination, low pay, unequal justice, and violence against 
African-Americans” (p. 129). Soviet propaganda campaigns were designed to disrupt the 
image of the United States government as a global paragon of freedom and equality by 
brandishing international scrutiny to the Civil Rights Movement.  
In fact, just one year after Truman initiated the US Campaign of Truth, the Civil 
Rights Congress, spearheaded by William L. Patterson and endorsed by Dr. W.E.B. Du 
Bois, submitted a scathing petition to the United Nations subcommittee on human rights 
titled We Charge Genocide: The Historic Petition to the United Nations for Relief from a 
Crime of the United States Government Against the Negro People. This petition argued 
that “the object of this genocide, as of all genocide, is the perpetuation of economic and 
political power by the few through the destruction of political protest by the many” (Civil 
Rights Congress, 1951, p. 5). Thus, Du Bois’ (1900) prophecy that “the world problem of 
the 20th century is the problem of the color line” began to manifest through Cold War 
geopolitics (Partington, 1977). People of color began leveraging the material conditions 
of oppression as advocacy tools to shed light upon tyrannical power structures. 
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Organizing active resistance against racism and white supremacy seized international 
attention by unveiling generational psychological trauma. 
Fear of atomic warfare and nuclear fallout necessitated a “Cold War” to avoid 
mutually assured destruction by external forces. Although America’s domestic racial 
issue posed a similar threat within. The Cold War between the two great superpowers 
posed existential questions about how the world should be organized and what moral 
orders should be followed. The United States responded earnestly to international 
concerns psychologically through the creation of the Unites States Information Agency 
(USIA). USIA was created on August 1, 1953, by the President’s Reorganization Plan 
No. 8 (18 F.R. 4542) and Executive Order 10477 to consolidate the US government’s 
information activities into a single program (U.S. Information and Educational Exchange 
Act of 1948). Activities formerly carried out by the Department of State's International 
Information Administration (IIA), Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA), Mutual 
Security Agency (MSA), and the existing United States Information Service (USIS) were 
merged into the operations of the new agency. However, USIS maintained its name and 
became USIA field offices. In a nutshell, almost all of the information related operations 
of the government were centralized under one organization for wartime efficiency. USIA 
would be tasked with mediating public perception of American society contrasted with 
Soviet society.  
USIA existed as an independent agency in the executive branch of government 
that operated under the Department of State’s foreign policy guidance. This organization 
exported American values, culture, and aspirations abroad to cultivate sociological and 
psychological countermeasures against communist propaganda (Ellul, 1965). American 
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historian Ibrahim Kendi (2016), noting USIA’s peacetime motto to “tell America’s story 
to the world,” describes the organization’s work as “American foreign public relations” 
(p. 404). It was driven to identify what “captive people find attractive, boring, theoretical 
and irritating” in “communist dominated countries” (Perry-Giles, 1994, p. 266). USIA, 
acting as a public relations agency for the US government, had extensive technical 
capabilities that it used to manipulate foreign audiences. USIA functioned as a state-
sponsored propaganda apparatus which equipped the United States with an instrument to 
vie for global prestige (Central Intelligence Agency, 1964; Perry-Giles, 1994) and 
utilized mass communication techniques to captivate the world—in many regards setting 
the precedent for mass media propaganda in the Information Age. 
Problem statement and questions 
This project investigates how USIA operated as a Cold War propaganda machine 
for the US government by critically examining its actions between 1953-1965, and 
explores how USIA framed the image of the American race relations at the nexus of the 
Cold War and the US Civil Rights Movement. By investigating content disseminated by 
USIA regarding civil rights, examining US national security reports, US State 
Department memos, and supporting national intelligence community documents this 
project aims to answer the following research questions: 
RQ 1: How did the USIA frame the American race relations throughout the 
Campaign for Truth? 
RQ 2: How did USIA bolster US prestige/soft power from 1953-1963?  
RQ 3: How did USIA use communication and public relations to effectively 
mask the ugliness of the Civil Rights Movement? 
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It is important to note that the modern study of human communications was sparked after 
World War I due to advancements in mass media technology and literacy. Subsequently, 
WWII accelerated the growth of communication disciplines after the world witnessed the 
creative and destructive power of wartime propaganda (Littlejohn, Foss, & Oetzel, 2017). 
Consequently, Littlejohn, Foss, & Oetzel (2017) assert that “scholars in the discipline of 
communication see communication as the organizing element of human life” (p. 6). This 
project contributes an investigation of American civil rights propaganda from a strategic 
communications perspective to unpack the human-rights induced crises faced by USIA 
during the Cold War. History is easily viewed as a series of events marked cleanly on a 
linear timeline, yet reality is multifaceted, circular and messy. This opening chapter sets 
the stage for a multilayered historical narrative by first contextualizing the mission and 
creation of USIA then defining key terms including propaganda, public relations, public 
diplomacy, and culture.  
Setting context 
 USIA was created in a tumultuous American political environment directed by the 
Truman Doctrine, which formally declared that the primary goal of US foreign policy 
was to contain the expansion of the international communist apparatus (Dudziak, 1988). 
Specifically, the Soviet Union needed to be contained both in terms of 1) territorial 
expansion beyond the Second World satellite states in eastern Europe and 2) ideological 
expansion into the “Third World”. Though today the term “Third World” is considered a 
pejorative term its usage during this time was purposeful to signify the relationship 
between the Western blocs, Soviet blocs and non-aligned powers which were almost 
exclusively comprised of former European colonies or protectorates in Africa, Asia and 
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Latin America. Throughout this project the term, “Third World” will be used to signify 
the symbolic relationships denoted the during time period defined. In regard to halting 
ideological expansion, Osgood (2006) contends that: 
the term ‘containment’ is misleading because it connotes passivity and implies a 
reactionary response to external stimulus. [While] in practice US operations 
abroad comprised a proactive effort to preserve and extend American power by 
manipulating political, economic and cultural developments in other societies. 
(p.106) 
Extending American power abroad required bolstering American prestige because, 
according to the Psychological Strategy Board (1953), “the most that a nation can aspire 
to and should aspire to in international relations is healthy respect” (p. 1481). This respect 
depends on public perception which is never completely static. Consequently, the 
Truman doctrine demonized thoughts and ideas perceived to be aligned with 
communism. In effect, this policy meant that US containment enabled international 
policing and censorship of liberal movements advocating for social justice reforms 
(Dudziak, 1988). Thus, reality was projected onto a stark black and white moral 
framework. In this worldview, the United States was just, noble, and good while the 
Soviet Union was unjust, ignoble, and evil. This framework created a dangerous pretense 
that the United States was fundamentally a benevolent power however American race 
relations made this social logic difficult to sustain.  
 For example, when USIA was introduced to the public, the organization was 
portrayed as a hub for objective news-like reporting on information connected to US 
foreign policy objectives without acknowledging its connection to political warfare. This 
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distinction allowed USIA’s information to be contrasted with propaganda from 
America’s enemies. In other words, Americans told the truth, Soviets told lies, creating 
an axiom designed to validate the moral legitimacy of American propaganda while 
vilifying Soviet propaganda (Osgood, 2006, p. 92). Commenting on this subtle 
distinction, the first director of USIA Theodore Striebert admitted 
although our publicly assigned mission does not explicitly point to our role as a 
weapon of political warfare, the current conflict of interests between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, in which each seeks its aims by methods other than 
the use of armed force, constitutes political warfare... The content of our 
operations–our message–must serve our special political warfare needs as well as 
our generalized long-term mission directly and concurrently. (USIA Strategic 
Principles 1954, as cited in Osgood, 2006, p. 92) 
This clandestine aspect of USIA enabled the US to challenge Soviet propaganda by 
highlighting macro-level disparities contributing to societal inequalities. The Soviet 
Union questioned American cultural ideologies through its propaganda and diplomacy in 
the international arena.  For instance, in 1946 when the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights was established, the Soviet Union used its political clout, garnered 
from rapid post-war industrial developments, to advocate for the creation of the UN sub-
commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. According 
to State Department officials, “this sub-commission was established on the initiative of 
the USSR, and there is every indication that that country and others will raise questions 
concerning our domestic problems in this regard” (Dudziak, 1988, p. 94). The domestic 
problems which posed the greatest moral and existential threat to US national security 
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were the appalling conditions of race relations, namely because the US touted itself as “a 
champion and defender of genuine independence movements and in general a progressive 
influence” (Foreign Relations of The United States, 1952–1954, Report to the President 
by the President’s Committee on International Information Activities). The US 
government declared itself an advocate for universal freedom to vie for ideological 
influence and combat Soviet propaganda. However, this “progressive” aspirational truth 
was juxtaposed with the harsh reality experienced by African Americans fighting to 
access the universal freedom and human rights guaranteed by the American constitution. 
In particular, the 14th amendment explicitly states that  
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV) 
Although, despite the letter of the Reconstruction era law, the American reality was much 
more complicated. Thus, the Cold War forced the US to contextualize the Jim Crow 
ideology to explain the violence generated by its praxis in society. Furthermore, 
according to Rotter (2013)  
liberation movements in Africa inevitably confronted Americans with their own 
racial policies and racial attitudes—the persistence of Jim Crow segregation in the 
southern states, of violence against African-Americans, or racial discrimination in 
jobs and housing throughout the country. (p.157) 
The US recognized that international appeals to the moral superiority of the American 
ideology, demonstrated by the freedoms it ostensibly granted to US citizens, reeked of 
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hypocrisy as “second-class” Black citizens were subjugated to systems of White 
supremacy, racial bigotry, and legally sanctioned acts of domestic terrorism (e.g., 
Dudziak, 1988, 2000; Grindy, 2008; Kendi, 2016). The Soviets pushed an offensive 
propaganda campaign titled “Hate America” which “simultaneously painted the United 
States in the harshest and most unflattering terms possible while presenting the Soviet 
Union to the rest of the world as a champion for peaceful coexistence” (Krenn, 2017, p. 
82). Soviet propaganda painted the US as an agent of Western imperialism while 
affirming the Soviet commitment to supporting liberation movements around the world. 
thereby highlighting a humanitarian incentive for brotherhood and unity called for by 
communism despite the state’s oppressive authoritarianism.  
 Soviet propagandists used every available opportunity to publicize the US’ dismal 
race relations around the world. By highlighting the US’ faults, the Soviets attempted to 
strengthen their prestige to the detriment of the American image. The US president’s 
committee on international information activities (1953) described the Soviets strengths 
in portraying themselves on the global stage saying: 
The foreign communist parties have sought, often with much success, to identify 
themselves, according to local conditions, as the working-class party, the anti-
imperialistic party or the anti-discrimination party. The Soviet Union has moved 
to exploit discontent through its foreign communist apparatus. Its readiness to 
create conditions of anarchy as a preliminary to seizing power is in itself an 
important advantage in the conflict. (Report to the President by the President’s 
Committee on International Information Activities) 
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The final clause is especially important because it implies more about the US’s approach 
to how the conflict with the Soviet s will play out than it says about the USSR’s 
approach. The text puts a positive spin on an incredibly tense report by identifying the 
opportunity presented by a threatening circumstance. Basically, noting that despite the 
damage being done to American prestige by the hands of Soviet propagandists this 
strength can be exploited as a weakness. As a result, the US identified Soviet appeals for 
“anarchy” and societal agitation as advantageous for drawing a meaningful contrast with 
American appeals for gradual reformism and integration. Fortifying an image of 
prosperity and peace had great public appeal. Von Eschen (2004) highlights that “US 
officials pursued a self-conscious campaign against worldwide criticism of US racism, 
striving to build cordial relations with new African and Asian states” (p. 4) because the 
US government felt that ideological “conflict would be played out in the nonaligned and 
newly emerging nations of the Middle East, Asia and Africa” (p. 7). To put it bluntly, the 
US government cared about the opinions and attitudes of Third World subjects because 
the nations they represented were mineral rich, geographically strategic, and perceived as 
politically susceptible to Soviet influence. The US wanted to stifle the development of 
diplomatic relationships between the emerging nations and the USSR to halt the flow of 
valuable natural resources into enemy possession. 
In 1948 Congress sanctioned the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act 
of 1948, more commonly known as the Smith-Mundt Act which enabled the US State 
Department to use informational and cultural programming as peacetime instruments of 
foreign policy. This legislative decision had two primary consequences: (1) it prohibited 
the domestic dissemination of information materials created for foreign audiences, and 
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(2) provided a mechanism to communicate with/to audiences outside of the borders of the 
United States (via broadcasting, face-to-face contacts, exchanges, the publishing of 
books, magazines, and other media of communication and engagement) (U.S. 
Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948). 
 The Act was meant “to promote a better understanding of the United States in 
other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United 
States and the people of other countries” (U.S. Information and Educational Exchange 
Act of 1948). USIA, once established, was equipped with an instrument to promote 
democratic ideals, bolster goodwill towards the US, and tell “America’s story to the 
world” (Government Accounting Office, 1973, p. 1). This motto frames the United States 
as a benevolent global benefactor in opposition to hostile tyrannical states and ideas. 
Although the American ideology had its share of oppressive impulses. These impulses 
were carried out via violent racial prejudice affirming cultural myths of white supremacy. 
In this context, USIA’s “information campaigns” were tailored to refute Soviet claims of 
American decadence and moral failure; replacing the operational term “propaganda” with 
the value-neutral term “information” to avoid negative association with Nazi Germany 
(Government Accounting Office, 1973). Unfortunately, efforts to scatter American 
propaganda around the world to influence public opinion often took higher priority than 
cultivating mutual understanding. Fosler-Lussier (2015) notes that, “the short-term aim of 
combatting Soviet propaganda about the United States meant that broadcasting the 
American message to other peoples usually seemed more urgent than developing truly 
mutual cultural exchange” with Third World subjects (p. 4). Mutual cultural exchange 
suggests a form of engagement where two or more parties interact with respect for 
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cultural differences. That said, the US often preferred for its cultural tendencies to 
encroach upon the cultural heritage of its partners to bolster allegiance to the US by any 
means necessary. The imbalance in USIA’s departmental focus is described in the 
landmark 1972 study on USIA conducted by the Government Accounting Office which 
stated:  
‘The Campaign of Truth’ launched in 1950 by President Truman as a 
psychological offensive against propaganda disseminated by the USS.R. appeared 
to digress from the mission of the overseas information program as set forth in the 
Smith-Mundt Act. In July 1952, the Advisory Commission on Information 
described the change in the mission of the overseas information program as a shift 
from an objective portrayal of the United States to one of ‘hard-hitting 
propaganda’ (Government Accounting Office, 1973, p. 16) 
Convincing skeptical international publics about the benefits of adopting the American 
way of life required a strong symbolic element to articulate the strengths offered by 
American capitalist democracy contrasted with Soviet communist totalitarianism. 
According to Belmonte (2010), campaigns designed by US intelligence officials 
propagated a carefully constructed cultural narrative of freedom, progress, and abundance 
as a means of protecting national security. Narratives of freedom and prosperity were 
bolstered through propaganda campaigns optimized to engender faith in the American 
Dream.  
 American attitudes towards race and racism provoked a profound moral dilemma 
for the international image of the United States in the mid-50s. USIA endeavored to 
promote a positive image of a tolerant democratic capitalist nation with benign ambitions 
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to mold other nations in its image. Yet, the United States practiced Jim Crow segregation 
and withheld full citizenship from its African-American minority. Hence the world 
witnessed the hypocrisy of a schizophrenic superpower struggling to interpret a chaotic 
reality. On the one hand America was a land of opportunity and prosperity yet on the 
other hand these concepts were foreign to a majority of African-Americans and members 
of the emerging non-white world watched with suspicion (Krenn, 2017, p.83). Juggling 
this paradox was a major concern to USIA’s efforts to influence global public opinion. 
Consequently, to vie for global prestige, USIA leveraged all elements attributable to 
American culture, economic strength, scientific and technological advancements to fight 
the Soviets in the Cold War.  
 The battle for hearts and minds of mass publics in Free World countries 
concerned ideological acquiescence to an American metanarrative being spread with 
missionary zeal. This battle was fought using culture as an ideological weapon to 
demonstrate the strength of the United States. In so doing, USIA used popular culture to 
appeal to foreign audiences as a tool to facilitate American cultural hegemony . The 
United States wanted to reinforce international allegiance from the globalizing world to 
ensure favorable access to resources, trade partners, and most importantly to suffocate 
communism by any means necessary. Thus, USIA used all available symbolic cultural 
resources afforded to express, explain, and interpret who America was to the world while 
at the same time counteracting Soviet propaganda. In the process, “African-Americans 
were utilized as living symbols of America’s commitment to equality and civil rights” 
(Krenn, 2006, p.86). With this intention, the explosive Civil Rights Movement’s tenacity 
as an exercise in popular protest against white supremacy was coopted into an American 
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myth of glory and perpetual progress. Thus, the modern international image of America 
was co-created with race relations in mind to develop pragmatic relationships with 
emerging decolonized nations.  
   Strategically, crafting images mindful of relevant societal factors aids in 
conjuring positive impressions within the minds of mass audiences. From USIA’s 
perspective containment meant using propaganda to disseminate narratives about the U.S. 
across the world which would inculcate favorable impressions of America. It is important 
to reiterate that propaganda is not inherently based upon lies or half-truths (Ellul, 1961). 
In fact, former deputy director of USIA Thomas Sorenson (1968) noted, “[t]o 
propagandize means in many minds to lie, to exaggerate, to manipulate, to subvert. So, 
the U.S. Government employs a euphemism [information program]” (p.3). For the sake 
of clarity, Sorenson continues noting:  
good propaganda is truthful, the truth–out of context and unexplained–is not 
always good propaganda. It is not good propaganda to tell the world of racial 
disturbances without, at the same time, reciting the steady if unspectacular 
progress toward an integrated society. (p.5) 
In the context of race relations, “good propaganda" required providing the necessary 
context to see America in a positive light, downplaying racism by emphasizing silver 
linings connected to race relations and the Civil Rights Movement. Great USIA 
propaganda leveraged all available channels of expression to curate simplified depictions 
of reality to help mediate conflicting interpretations of events in an increasingly 
complicated world. Through repetition, American integration propaganda sought to gain 
medium to long-term influences over popular belief systems and reinforcing 
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anticommunist ideologies (Ellul, 1962). This version of reality builds on USIA trend-
based logic which contends that progress towards equality for all Americans was 
forthcoming; African-Americans and international audiences just needed to wait and see. 
Fortunately, USIA made sure that international audiences would literally see this vision 
through pamphlets, posters, television, film, and cultural initiatives, often referred to as 
public diplomacy. 
USIA established a vast network of contacts including executives from 
Hollywood, the Advertising Council, the Museum of Modern Art, and MIT’s social 
science department among other institutions in addition to key artists, athletes, writers, 
and public intellectuals (Von Eschen, 2004). All of these connections would play a part in 
a semi-synchronized effort to herald the United States as an exemplary nation for the 
world to mimic. Countering Soviet peace propaganda compelled a comprehensive assault 
to reclaim the “good words” for influencing international minds (Sorenson, 1968). Thus, 
in an innovative series of actions, the American propaganda machine explored alternative 
cultural and intellectual products from the United States to bolster goodwill towards the 
United States. 
 Of course, cultivating a favorable image on the world stage required strategic 
posturing. USIA recognized that making impactful impressions on the hearts and minds 
of audiences around the world necessitated sound social scientific research to 
revolutionize technological processes for influencing public thoughts and perceptions. To 
accomplish this goal, USIA focused on five core strategic organizational competencies 
that were applied to its broad strategic effort. According to Cull (2008) these 
competencies were  
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1) listening: research, analysis, and the feedback of that information into the policy 
– process, 2) advocacy; the creation and dissemination of information materials to 
build understanding of policy, issue or facet of life of significance to the actor, 3) 
cultural diplomacy; the dissemination of cultural practices as a mechanism to 
promote the interests of the actor, 4) exchange diplomacy: the exchange of persons 
with another actor for mutual advantage and 5) international broadcasting. (p. xv) 
Each of these components were honed to rival the purported $2 billion propaganda 
machine that Eisenhower believed Moscow financed (Cull, 2008, p. 126). Congressional 
appropriations for USIA during the early post-war years fluctuated drastically between 
$86 and $125 million dollars annually as the organization struggled to get consistent 
funding. USIA was routinely misunderstood because according to Sorenson (1965), 
“[USIA] is reluctant to be explicit about their victories … Thus when the Agency goes to 
Congress each year for money, it cannot in open hearings claim many specific 
accomplishments” (p. 75). Consequently, programs went underfunded unless they were 
connected to psychological warfare against the Soviets. Appeasing hawkish members of 
Congress played an instrumental role in fortifying USIA’s operational budget (Cull, 
2008b). Although the severe lack of comparable funding to the Soviet Union primed 
USIA to rapidly innovate cost-efficient influence techniques.  
 Enhancing America’s global image required tact and finesse so as to contextualize 
the nation favorably. Yet, disseminating messages praising the merits of democratic 
capitalism were complicated by a domestic political and cultural revolution actively 
challenging the United States to practice what it preached.  USIA’s key message about 
race emphasized the “great progress” of the “Negro race” toward full participation in 
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American life (National Security Council, 1955). Although, American democratic 
discrimination painted a sordid picture for foreign eyes.  
USIA Operations 
USIA’s propaganda campaigns incorporated research on sociological, psychological, and 
cultural trends into their action planning and strategy building, and, after implementing 
the campaigns, evaluated the impact generated by their effort. Propagandists and strategic 
communications experts tailored content to mold positive stereotypes of America through 
the process of telling America’s Story to the world. The US was motivated to use culture 
to facilitate American hegemony because the battle over words, ideas, and images 
demanded popular symbols. Appeals to indirect imperial authority through culture is 
subtle and have the potential to affect public opinion via subconscious faculties. This 
indirect form of warfare allowed the Cold War to remain primarily on a psychological 
level since the conflict needed to be mediated without triggering a nuclear apocalypse. 
 The acting national security directive (NSC 10/2) was framed as a retaliatory 
response to the “vicious covert activities of the USSR and communist China and the 
governments, parties and groups dominated by them (hereinafter collectively referred to 
as ‘International Communism’” (Office of the Historian, n.d., p. 746). As a defense 
mechanism, USIA’s retaliatory response was to determine how to best craft America’s 
story. USIA cultural and informational agents were sent around the globe to collect 
psychological, political, and cultural information valuable for a general war effort against 
communist ideas. Defeating communism required figuring out what images and ideas 
motivated people in different cultural contexts. With this intelligence collected, USIA 
agents could then create culturally sensitive messages to enhance US prestige. USIA 
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primarily focused intelligence-gathering efforts on "Free World” or non-Communist 
audiences. In the beginning, USIA’s propaganda expressed the following objectives: 
(1) US aims of uniting and strengthening the Free World and reducing the 
communist threat without war; (2) exposing and combatting communist 
colonialism; (3) developing and broadening peaceful uses of atomic energy 
and (4) seeking to convince other peoples that the US stands and works for 
peace. (National Security Council, 1955, p. 529) 
As such, newsworthy events were exploited to manipulate the image of the United States 
in ways which supported a narrative of inevitable progress and positive societal 
development. USIA narratives emphasized positive societal progress to portray an 
optimistic perspective of American society.  
 Creating an optimistic view of the United States fit a Cold War imperative 
outlined in the 1953 Report to the President by the President’s Committee on 
International Information Activities which opens by acknowledging that US policies are 
informed by the assumption that the Soviets are pursuing “world domination” 
(President’s Committee on International Information Activities, 1953, p. 1795). In a 
contest where adversaries become ruthless, all becomes fair. Since the Soviets sought 
domination, the US was justified to retaliate with full strength. Following this logic, 
USIA adopted a bifurcated framework of the world where either you were with the US or 
you were against the US. This dichotomy enabled USIA to attribute propaganda to 
sources other than itself which allowed USIA to act with plausible deniability of political 
and cultural subversion while implementing the organizational model listed in figure 1 







This model of USIA’s fieldwork is graphically illustrated to inform foreign information 
activities. In this figure, a reservoir represents the proposed one-way flow of information 
to bolster US foreign policy initiatives and cultivate a favorable image of the United 
States. The audiences in “Country X” are represented as vessels waiting to receive 
“water” from the US, the water representing the USIA’s efforts to mitigate adverse 
influence from Soviet propaganda. The “flow of information into Country X” implies that 
in any given targeted country USIA aims to influence individuals through the filtering of 
key information for designated audience groups via varied media channels. This 
infographic positions USIA messages as psychological tools wielded to control attitudes, 
attributions, and stereotypes about the US. Since USIA’s information objectives were 
informed by US national security reports, Communism and socialist ideologies were 
identified as the primary threat to national security. As a result, USIA was given an 
effective mandate to create programs and activities that utilized available information on 
target audiences to influence attitudes, beliefs and behaviors. The figure leaves much to 
be explained regarding how public opinion was evaluated or how the processes involved 
in engaging foreign publics. However, it is clear that within the Crusade for 
Freedom/Campaign for Truth, USIA used all available means to exert influence upon 
international audiences, especially if this meant that undermining the legitimacy of 
geopolitical adversaries. Crippling oppositional movements in the Cold War required the 
total exploitation of mass media and legitimized the use of psychological warfare.  
 Although a central concern shared especially by non-Western audiences involved 
American attitudes regarding race relations. In their operations, USIA had to address 
concerns shared especially by non-Western audiences about American Jim Crow race 
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relations, relations were exacerbated by the legacy of US government sanctioned slavery 
in the 19th century, subsequent draconian race laws and policies in the 20th century and 
complicit stances on 20th century European colonial power structures in Asia and Africa. 
Ironically, to positively portray the US as a socially progressive society, USIA 
strategically crafted narratives that emphasized hope for progress in US race relations. 
Diplomatic historian Dudziak (2000) notes the American government’s foreign policy 
argument articulated that “democracy, not totalitarian forms of government … provided a 
context that made [racial] reconciliation and redemption possible” (p. 49). This context 
relied upon narratives stressing progressive policies and attitudes cultivated in American 
society. Portraying a progressive narrative of peace and diversity became a hallmark of 
global propaganda in the wake of WWII as geopolitical power dynamics fluctuated 
dramatically and anticolonial political movements across Asia and Africa usurped 
western European settler-colonial governance structures. The United States and the 
USSR both emerged from the war as premier international superpowers. Describing the 
global political shift during this period, Mabrey III (2009) asserts that: 
The dissolution of colonialist hegemony radically altered the geopolitical world 
after World War II. New nation states emerged that were once under the yoke of 
colonial powers. These states no longer relied on or were forced to answer to 
colonialist powers. The newly formed post-colonial states helped transition the 
meaning of the Third World away from an excluded internal population toward a 
nation-state focus. (p. 45) 
New nation states catalyzed new political alliances and partnerships. Consequently, with 
two dominant superpowers contesting for ideological supremacy, sovereign nations in the 
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Third World were caught in an ideological crossfire. Eastern and Western political blocs 
vied for strategic geopolitical alliances with new coming states. However, numerous 
nations in the Third World rallied behind a foreign policy of strategic non-alignment. 
Fearful of the consequences of one hegemonic power taking control of the fledgling 
globalized world, the non-aligned movement “aimed to preserve the neutrality and 
freedom of maneuver of those states disinclined, for practical or moral reasons, to choose 
sides in the East-West struggle” (McMahon, 2013, p. 6). The trend towards non-
alignment was perceived as a threat to US national security and became a primary target 
of USIA propaganda. Organized political movements with large followings possess the 
potential to disorganize orderly black and white political structures and sway the world 
order towards chaos. This framing of reality believed in a monstrous mythologized Soviet 
Union with ambitions of installing global slavery. Considering the growing importance of 
the United Nations as the most prestigious forum for multinational congregations to 
collaborate and express grievances, non-alignment was regarded as a Soviet plot to 
undermine American authority on the international stage. USIA endeavored to influence 
the perception of information concerning the US which forced the agency to evaluate the 
conditions of race relations for nations pursuing non-alignment. Prestige supports the 
structure of mythologized beliefs and Jim Crow America wanted the non-aligned world 
to believe in the integrity of its moral leadership. In effect, providing a curated narrative 
to frame, structure and bias reality.  
Defining key terms 
What is Propaganda? 
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Throughout this project I use the term propaganda to describe “the conscious and 
intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses” (Bernays, 
1928, p. 37). This conceptualization of propaganda was invented by Edward Bernays, 
arguably America’s foremost propaganda expert. Propaganda is a frequently 
misunderstood faculty of human civilizations. Often viewed with disdain and regarded 
with apprehension especially in Western democracies where propaganda is regularly 
associated with authoritarian regimes, propaganda is a tool which can be used for 
prosocial and antisocial ends. Propaganda should not be perceived as an inherently evil, 
rather propaganda should be understood as an intricate device for influencing public 
opinion. When framed as a sociological tool characteristic of civilizations, holistic 
discourse understands propaganda as a multifaceted, value-neutral instrument of 
influence, latent within society. Once the instrument is used it takes on the values of the 
propagandist. Furthermore, the applications of propaganda are infinite because 
propaganda is “tied to realities” which are subjectively constructed (Ellul, 1965, p. 20). 
For the purposes of this project, mass-media propaganda is defined as a value-
neutral instrument designed to “arouse an active and mythical belief” (Ellul, 1965, p.25). 
Ellul’s argument contends that whereas pre-20th century was concerned with installing 
beliefs, ideas and opinions through orthodoxy, post-20th century propaganda concerns 
provoking actions through orthopraxy. Alongside innovations in mass media technology, 
propaganda has also evolved to target the “organized habits of groups” a distinction both 
subtle and powerful (Bernays, 1928, p. 1). While respecting the significance of attitudes, 
beliefs, and opinions, modern propaganda leverages technologies of communication to 
manipulate societal beliefs, biases, and interpretations of reality. Ellul (1965) contends 
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that propaganda is a sociological phenomenon leveraged by people to create “organized 
myths” that “furnish [individuals] with a complete system for explaining the world” 
(p.11). Thus, propaganda functions to control which mental frameworks should be used 
to understand current and historical events, thereby dominating the narratives that govern 
societal action.  
There are numerous works dedicated to exploring the innerworkings of 
propaganda, according to van Dijk (2006) propaganda is as an instrument of influence 
used to persuade audiences to conduct themselves in accordance with the interests of the 
propagandist. Ozman & Yazici Yakin (2012) contend that propaganda is “the deliberate 
attempt to manipulate the perceptions of the targeted/created audience regarding an idea, 
an issue or a group in accordance with the interests of the propagandist through the use of 
words, images and speech” (p. 585). Consequently, in the context of psychological 
warfare, state propaganda efforts function as discursive expressions of foreign policy” 
framing ideas, values, beliefs and attitudes into narratives alongside simplified political 
agendas as evidenced by the staunch anti-communism rhetoric of USIA’s international 
efforts.  
 Propaganda concerns how reality is understood and attempts to enforce 
hegemonic power over narratives despite the supposed value-neutralness described 
above. Modern propaganda takes this concern and uses available media channels to  
achieve the propagandists goals. This element of propaganda is built upon the 
psychological concept of framing which is a fundamental building block for strategic 
communication. Connecting psychological triggers associated with particular words, 
phrases, and images to optimize message design for strong emotional responses. As a 
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result, propaganda campaigns conduct primary research about target populations to 
gauge: 1) what themes/images are salient and 2) how to frame messages for target 
audiences. Communication scholar Goffman (1974), describes framing as: “the definition 
of a situation . . . built up in accordance with principles of organization that govern 
events—at least social ones—and our subjective involvement in them” (p. 10). Subjective 
webs of meaning help socially construct reality and provide a basis for shared 
interpretations of events. These shared interpretations become “common sense” and 
influence the perception of situations. Therefore, propaganda provides context for 
individuals to understand information through a three-step process, “locate, perceive and 
label” (Goffman, 1974, p. 21). Once a situation is defined, reference points are identified 
creating imaginary boundaries around concepts. After socially constructed boundaries are 
identified by propagandists then messages are crafted to locate specific words, framed in 
a particular context relative to a specific worldview, and then evaluated to ascribe a moral 
quality.  
 In the case of USIA, a psychological war was being waged to imprint a “schemata 
of interpretation” in the minds of targeted publics (Goffman, 1974, p.15). In other words, 
a collection of stereotypes is suggested for publics to rely upon to understand and respond 
to events. Building on Goffman’s theory, Hallahan (1999) notes that the framing process 
“operates by biasing the cognitive processing of information by individuals” (p. 208). 
Furthermore Hallahan (1999) establishes that: 
a frame limits or defines the message's meaning by shaping the inferences that 
individuals make about the message. Frames reflect judgments made by message 
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creators or framers. Some frames represent alternative valancing of information. 
(p. 207) 
In other words, when propagating a positive image of the United States, USIA needed to 
compile a collection of favorable stereotypes about America. This collection of 
stereotypes would socially construct a worldview enabling its adopters to make sense of 
the world. Worldviews influence how individuals and groups interact with others by 
providing a strategic suggestion for its audiences to take. By outlining organizational 
goals, objectives, strategies, and tactics, USIA determined what content it wanted its 
publics to focus on to build a narrative which strategically favored American interests 
and goals. Ergo, “the mechanism by which ideas are disseminated on a large scale is 
propaganda, in a broad sense of an organized effort to spread a particular belief or 
doctrine” (Bernays, 1928, p.48). Determining which information should be presented and 
where emphasis should be placed both constitute primary challenges to powerful 
storytelling which is exactly what USIA aimed to accomplish.  Developing compelling 
narratives aimed to influence attitudes and behaviors of target audiences required USIA 
to fashion key messages, themes, and ideas to tell compelling stories. Hallahan (1999) 
argues that storytelling is the most complex form of framing and that it functions by “(a) 
selecting key themes or ideas that are the focus of the message and (b) incorporating a 
variety of storytelling or narrative techniques that support that theme” (p. 207).  
Recognizing the challenge of effective storytelling, USIA developed a robust strategic 
communication hub to build the capacity required to aggregate global information linked 
to themes, ideas, and narrative techniques (General Accounting Office, 1972, p. 1). 
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Today, contemporary strategic communication guides from the NATO 
intelligence community build from USIA’s blueprint prioritizing impactful storytelling 
and aligning terminology used by NATO members (Bliss, Smith, Eaton, & Ridgway, 
2013, p. 53). Choosing specialized language helps to reduce ambiguity and minimizes the 
potential for misunderstandings among NATO agencies. NATO’s 2019 strategic 
communications guide distinguishes stories which are “a temporally, spatially, and 
causally connected sequence of events”) from narratives which describe “morals drawn 
from stories” (Bolt & Haiden, 2019, p.54). This guide was made in an effort to shift from 
the descriptive language circulating in NATO discourse to more prescriptive language to 
justify the narratives generated by NATO members a prime being the Marshall Plan 
which combined “liberal economic ideals with economic aid and cultural/political appeal 
of American ‘way of life’, which stood in stark contrast to planned economy Soviet 
Communism  and political oppression” (p.46). This modern guide to language usage 
amongst NATO reifies the logic of global peacekeeping through American hegemony 
and privileges the role of governmental narratives, storytelling and propaganda.  
What is Public Relations? 
USIA’s operations created both overt and opaque propaganda for international 
audiences and one component of its strategy involved public relations which refers to the 
conscious effort of an organization to influence the attitudes and behaviors of relevant 
key publics (Grunig, 1993). This pursuit involves framing information to support 
organizational goals to support an integral relationship management component. 
According to communication theorist James Grunig (1993), “modern governments and 
other international organizations thus find themselves using public relations strategies as 
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they conduct what political scientists have called public diplomacy” (p. 141). In Grunig’s 
view, public diplomacy utilizes the tools from the public relations toolbox to 
accommodate US foreign policy initiatives (General Accounting Office, 1972; Sun, 
2008).  
This thesis ascribes value to Grunig’s (1993) four basic models of international 
public relations; 1) press agentry model geared solely towards generating publicity, 2) 
public information model which disseminates “relatively objective information” through 
mass media communication, 3) two-way asymmetrical model which “uses social science 
research to identify attitudes and to develop messages that appeal to those attitudes which 
persuade publics to behave as the organization wants” and 4) two-way symmetrical 
model operates as the most ethical model building upon the other models while using 
communication to “improve understanding with strategic publics” (p. 144). These models 
are laid out in an evolutionary hierarchy moving towards two-way symmetrical 
relationships as the ideal form of public relations. Although Grunig (1993) notes, 
the asymmetrical models can be practiced ethically … practitioners must be able 
to confirm that the organization knows what consequences are best for both the 
organization and the public – and the public does not – and that it is right to 
resolve the conflict by changing the public alone and not the organization. (p.146) 
In an ethical asymmetrical model, the organization is assumed to possess better 
intelligence than the public therefore the organization knows what is best for all parties 
involved. It important to acknowledge the ethical assumptions made by Grunig (1993) as 
he exemplifies the orthodoxy in public relations and reflects on the history of the 
discipline. Furthermore, USIA subscribed to Gruning’s assumption that propaganda 
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follows a similar evolutionary hierarchy adapting to the circumstances of a historical 
context.   
 This logic echoes the sentiments of Edward Bernays, the father of modern public 
relations who headed the National Committee for Adequate US Overseas Information 
Program, a non-partisan group advocating for an information program that was “a 
powerful offensive and defensive weapon for our nation and vital to our national 
strength” (Herrmann, Markiw, & Sullinger, n.d., p.15). Bernays argues that social 
engineering is a necessity for functional governance in a democratic society which helped 
inspired the ethos of USIA propaganda operations (Bernays, 1947). Although, Bernays’ 
theories of propaganda possess a profoundly pessimistic bias concerning the decision-
making abilities of large groups in democratic societies. Bernays fundamentally assumes 
that mass publics are stupid, and incapable of processing complicated information due to 
herd-like primal instincts to react impulsively to signals generated by the movements of 
large groups. Such is the case especially in large democratic republics where the people 
are sovereign and public opinion equals political power. In my opinion this notion 
undervalues the character of human beings and collectives. Entertaining Bernays 
pessimism ultimately transforms people into objects which should be manipulated and 
exploited to control an inherent psychological vulnerability. As a result, he articulated the 
function of public relations as the “engineering of consent” to allow an elite “invisible 
government” to shape the perception of unintelligent masses thereby enabling a 
“smoothly functioning society” (Bernays, 1928). In the geopolitical context of the Cold 
War, US government executives determined that psychological warfare is “not a field of 
endeavor separable from the main body of diplomatic, economic, and military measures 
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by which the United States seeks to achieve its national objectives. It is an ingredient of 
such measures” (Jackson Committee, 1953a, p. 1797). Furthermore, according to the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1953 “psychological warfare comprises the planned use of 
propaganda and related informational measures designed to influence the opinions, 
emotions, attitudes, and behavior of enemy or other foreign groups in such a way as to 
support the accomplishment of national policies and aims, or a military mission.” 
(Linebarger, 2015, p.315). Consequently, the larger goals of US foreign policy and USIA 
constituted a complex operation requiring a network of strategic communication activities 
including public relations. Building trust between nations requires a critical relationship 
management function and thus USIA assumed responsibility for the information driving 
diplomacy. Accordingly, propaganda campaigns designed to support foreign policy were 
mixed interchangeably with advocacy and public relations. 
 US international relations strategy relied on reports from USIA and Bernays’ 
shepherding bias is laden throughout Cold War American statecraft logic contending that 
“propaganda should be a flexible instrument of policy. It is a basic misconception to 
regard it as an independent instrument separate from policy” (Jackson Committee, 1953a, 
p. 1869). Because in order to create stability USIA needed to protect international 
audiences from the danger of communism which could manipulate the same 
psychological vulnerabilities for evil purposes.  Thus, initiating a US propaganda 
machine designed to influence the hearts and minds of international audiences via 
scientific social engineering. Adapting constantly through audience analysis to optimize 
propaganda as a mechanism of strategic communication.  
What is Public Diplomacy? 
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 Lenczowski (2008) defines public diplomacy as “the art and practice of 
governments communicating with the people of other countries, [which] is an important 
component of a comprehensive ideological strategy” (p.17). Lenczowski (2008) further 
notes how “the US must conduct its public diplomacy with war aims in mind – even 
though much of the activity will properly have little or nothing to do with war at all” (p. 
17). Accordingly, public diplomacy addresses the communications involved in 
international politics of culture and representation. The exchange of culture and ideas 
across varied communication mediums fosters community while highlighting a society's 
poetic, artistic, and cultural contributions to the world. During the Cold War, foreign 
policy directive NSC 168 addressed US motives for conducting information activities 
through public diplomacy stating: 
[t]he primary purpose of the information program should be to persuade foreign 
peoples that it lies in their own interest to take actions which are also consistent 
with the national objectives of the United States. The goal should be to harmonize 
wherever possible the personal and national self-interest of foreigners with the 
national objectives of the United States (President’s Committee on International 
Information Activities, 1953, p.1838).  
In 1954, the US State Department began sponsoring the Cultural Presentations Program 
through the President's Emergency Fund for International Affairs (Fosler-Lussier, 2015). 
This program initially received $8 million in appropriations from Congress to allow 
Eisenhower to “meet extraordinary or unusual circumstances arising in the international 
field” (Eisenhower, 1954). The extraordinary circumstance was a growing need for 
peacetime propaganda and an information program depended on the curation, 
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construction, and dissemination of a coherent narrative to frame US domestic and foreign 
policy consistently alongside the interests of the foreign audiences being addressed. 
Culture was identified as a vehicle that contributes to national narrative-building efforts 
because of its mass appeal. According to section 2, point (c) of the congressional 
reorganization plan #8 of 1953 which established USIA: 
The Secretary of State shall direct the policy and control the content of a program, 
for use abroad, on official United States positions, including interpretations of 
current events, identified as official positions by an exclusive descriptive label 
(U.S.C.02 Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953) 
With this one clause from Congress, USIA’s interpretations of current events became 
matters of fact, if not truth itself. This meant any forms of US propaganda were framed 
as declarations of objective truth instead of culturally biased interpretations. Public 
diplomacy leverages people-to people exchanges, educational events, and exhibitions as 
strategic cultural assets which constitutes forms of “soft power” (Nye, 2004). Power, in 
and of itself, becomes political when human organization is concerned (Harris, 1993; 
hooks, 1994). Therefore, motivations, intentions, and subsequent consequences linked to 
public diplomacy must be regarded with respect to the power-dynamics operating upon 
agents engaging in diplomatic systems. Consequently, the narrative-building strategy 
used to support USIA public diplomacy initiatives will be investigated to understand 
how soft power is leveraged through strategic communication campaigns. USIA 
strategies designed to vie for political clout and cultivate favorable relations should be 
evaluated within a communicative framework. Hallahan, et al. (2007) discuss the scope 
and functions of strategic communication in a post-modern environment and 
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acknowledge, “[s]trategic communication also includes examining how an organization 
presents itself in society as a social actor in the creation of public culture and in the 
discussion of public issues” (p.27). Juxtaposing the dawn of the information age with an 
American society facing a national identity crisis supplied USIA plenty of work 
especially regarding race relations. 
Contemporary public diplomacy scholars describe how government public 
diplomacy campaigns have been influenced by theories like soft power, discussing stick-
and-carrot incentive strategies to influence international relations (Nye, 2004), 
international political marketing (Sun, 2008), development communication and nation-
building (Dutta-Bergman, 2005). These approaches forward a model of public diplomacy 
that operates to fulfill a relationship management function. Due to the complexity of 
international relations, public diplomacy and propaganda cannot be evaluated using 
traditional political economic calculus. I argue that an approach to examine the value of 
cultural exchanges facilitated through public diplomacy may be constructively 
complicated by what Richard & Rudnyckyj (2009) call “affect economy.” In their terms, 
the affect economy paradigm “provide(s) [an] analytical purchase on the connection 
between economic transformations and affective transactions” (p.58). Language from 
state department and government officials revolves around the concept of the 
marketplace of ideas which leverages Capitalist economic reasoning. Such logic 
encourages a laissez-faire mentality for understanding societal influences on the 
economic market and business decision-making. However, this same laissez-faire ethos 
can be extended to belief systems in the socio-political sphere. The thought of ideological 
domination fueled the terror felt by American and Soviet governments viewing the 
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other’s ideological system as an existential threat. Soft power in this context serves as a 
social lubricant easing tension between opposing ideological systems. 
Critical sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s (1986) defines social capital as “the 
aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable 
network” (Bourdieu, 1986, pp. 248–249). In my perspective, social capitalization 
captures the essence of the relationship building strategy facilitated through cultural 
diplomacy. Cultural ambassadors are often referred to as goodwill ambassadors and I 
believe that goodwill can be best understood as a form of social capital.  
 Programs designed to target the “hearts and minds” of foreign audiences interface 
between systems of narrative logics and affective modes of processing. Effective, public 
diplomacy advocacy efforts and campaigns are (1) empathetic (2) coherent, (3) possess 
narrative fidelity, all of which conspire to constructively complicate the image of the 
United States in a positive way (Adichie, 2009), in addition to being interactive with the 
cultural frameworks/logics of the intended message recipients.   
 Thus, while the Cold War was waged to contest words, ideas, and values on the 
global stage the both the US and the USS.R propagated narratives wherein the opposing 
nation was a self-interested imperial power which needed to be dismantled (Parry-Giles, 
1994). Narratives are created and interpreted through a cultural lens and this fact was a 
central philosophical tenant for USIA propaganda. Public diplomacy then  symbolizes the 
conscious targeting of international publics in addition to dignitaries to affect 
international political systems. Consequently, USIA played a vital role in analyzing 
foreign cultures, values and traditions to enhance strategic communication.  
How is Culture Defined? 
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Culture is an amorphous term with numerous connotations and definitions which 
are constantly being contested. Thus, this project regards culture as a site of public 
dispute and examines the use of cultural appeals in USIA propaganda. Former USIA 
public diplomacy specialist Richard Arendt provides an adept synthesis of culture and 
diplomacy from the USIA perspective:    
‘Culture’ ... denote[s] the complex of factors of mind and values which define a 
country or group, especially those factors transmitted by the process of intellect, 
i.e., by ideas. ‘Cultural relations’ then (and its synonym – at least in the US – 
‘cultural affairs’) means literally the relations between national cultures, those 
aspects of intellect and education lodged in any society that tend to cross borders 
and connect with foreign institutions. Cultural relations grow naturally and 
organically, without government intervention – the transactions of trade and 
tourism, student flows, communications, book circulation, migration, media 
access, inter-marriage – millions of daily cross-cultural encounters. If that is 
correct, cultural diplomacy can only be said to take place when formal diplomats, 
serving national governments, try to shape and channel this natural flow to 
advance national interests. (Arendt, 2005 p. 45) 
This account provides a helpful context informing of how culture is framed within USIA. 
In essence, culture can be taken to mean a country’s best thoughts and ideas. 
Furthermore, the concept of culture as described by Arendt connects the concept of 
cultural exports with the thoughts and values of their creators. Cultural diplomacy 
functioned as a tool utilized by governments to build strategic relationships with other 
nation states and foreign citizens by leveraging cultural exports to build connections with 
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foreign audiences. Cultural exports take numerous forms for USIA including, expositions 
at world fairs, documentaries, people-to-people exchanges, radio broadcasts, and jazz 
ambassador tours. 
Cultural relations are impacted through social interactions between diplomats, 
dignitaries, businesses, musicians, artists, students and citizens alike. The exchange 
between cultural heritages is vital for constructive growth within the international 
community. In a study researching the communicative mechanisms of public diplomacy, 
Comer & Bean (2012) argue that engagement with foreign audiences closely resembles 
persuasive communication aimed at persuading foreign publics to empathize with 
American policies, rather than being open-ended conversations aimed at giving voice to 
multiple viewpoints (pp. 216-217). USIA’s cultural shows and people-to-people 
programs facilitated the possibility for open-ended dialogue. Jazz music in particular 
served as a powerful symbolic representation of American democracy which became 
emblematic as America’s proudest and most distinctive cultural product. As Fosler-
Lussier (2015) explains: 
Jazz also gave the State Department a means of shaping perceptions of America’s 
racial problems by programming black, white, and integrated ensembles 
according to political need. Because the civil rights movement within the United 
States was drawing attention abroad, the issue of race was nearly omnipresent 
throughout the planning and execution of the tours. A typical feature of cultural 
diplomacy is its indirectness. It is difficult to measure any changes in attitude or 
increases in prestige due specifically to musical performances. Yet calling on 
African American musicians as cultural diplomats was a more direct strategy. 
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Because race was omnipresent in critiques of the United States in the foreign 
press, sending African Americans abroad offered a rare opportunity for the State 
Department to present observable evidence about the achievements of its black 
citizens. (p. 19) 
Cultural presentation programs enabled jazz artists to symbolically link an American 
depiction of universal freedom through rhythms and harmonies when contrasted with the 
rigidity of European classical music (Khatiashvili, 2019). Ideas like this transcend 
abstraction and provide propaganda with a cultural edge. Marshall Stearns, founder of the 
Institute of Jazz Studies, designed the State Departments strategy for presenting jazz 
abroad, noted how “a jazz band exemplifies an ideal solution of the increasing conflict 
between the individual and the group in modern society” and that jazz therefore 
embodied the democratic process in action (Fosler-Lussier, 2015, p. 79). Effectively, jazz 
was regarded as a musical style rooted in freedom and openness, consequently, the 
cultural presentations program, framed jazz as the face of racially segregated America in 
the midst of the Cold War and the swelling Civil Rights Movement. Implicit arguments 
designed to progressively bolster post-race narratives were embedded within USIA 
propaganda in documentaries, library reading materials, posters, and so on (Krenn, 2017). 
These maneuvers bolstered the image of the United States as a progressive integrated 
society where conditions for African Americans were lightyears beyond Reconstruction.  
Research Area and Critical Orientation 
In this study, I use a discursive constructivist methodology to interpret and 
explore how American Cold War propaganda was developed by USIA to tell America’s 
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story abroad. The discursive constructivist methodology entails a relativist analytic 
project positing discourse as  
the medium through which versions of the world are constructed and made urgent 
or reworked as trivial and irrelevant. For social scientists working with DC the 
study of discourse becomes the central way of studying mind, social processes, 
organizations and events as they are continually made live in human affairs 
(Potter & Hepburn, 2008, p. 1). 
American propaganda during the Cold War era integrated new forms of mass media 
communications technology with a sophisticated variety of strategies and tactics to 
manipulate public opinion around the world. Blending traditional message broadcasting 
with interpersonal forms of advocacy (cultural exchanges). Thus, the discursive 
constructivist approach facilitates an analysis of contextually negotiated cultures, social 
structures and power relations. Exploring the diffusion of information from USIA helps 
articulate the paradox between the Jim Crow ideology and the America society espoused 
international and domestic values while reflecting on the material consequences of Cold 
War information operations (e.g., psychological warfare, coup d’états). Linking the 
actions of the USIA with the complex of intelligence gathering agencies operating on 
behalf of the US executive branch (e.g., CIA, FBI, USIS) complicates the Cold War 
narrative by acknowledging the explicit propagandistic expressions of US foreign policy. 
The goal being to agitate the “clear” moral and political dichotomy prescribed by the US 
foreign policy by contesting the production of knowledge. 
Telling America’s story required sophisticated audience analysis because 
propaganda leverages subjective meaning-making processes within unique contextual 
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environments.  This notion was expounded by Harvard Political Scientist Joseph Nye’s 
(2004) “soft power” concept which operates by identifying outcomes generated by public 
diplomacy initiatives to establish generic conditions impacting diplomacy. Soft power is 
an integral component to Cold War psychological warfare and its study investigates the 
invisible forces which exert pressures on public consciousness and reinforce ideologies 
and mythologies. Pamment (2014) argues that a singular model of interpreting soft power 
must be rejected in order to “question why such institutional ideologies are preferred and 
how they find their place within the overarching diplomatic machinery” (p. 54). 
Methodologically using Pamment’s (2014) interpretative “articulation” theory of 
knowledge provides an analytical tool to “understand how profound institutional 
pressures serve to discipline, appropriate and rearticulate the ideal categories of public 
diplomacy and evaluation to suit pragmatic goals … [and how] the ‘zeitgeist’ of national 
foreign policies utilize soft power and public diplomacy in support of strategic goals, and 
within oversight structures” (p. 54). Pamment (2014) notes three strategic benefits to 
applying his articulation paradigm,  
(i) encapsulate[s] public diplomacy, soft power and brands as expressions of 
foreign policy; (ii) communication within a network of interrelated activities such 
as other areas of foreign policy; and (iii) the idea that any chosen mode of 
communication may be bent or appropriated into being a tool of policy ( p. 54). 
Approaching this inquiry from a critical orientation enables research that interrogates 
systems of control. Following McKerrow (1989), I am investigating control systems to 
“unmask or demystify the discourse of power. The aim [being] to understand the 
integration of power/knowledge in society [and thereby influence social relations]” 
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(p.91). Nations are constantly vying for international influence by promoting or 
contesting popular narratives to describe a complex shared reality and understanding how 
narratives of the US were supported or challenged will contribute an understanding of the 
constraints influencing soft power dynamics invoked through public diplomacy. 
Exploring this research area furthers my professional interests in public diplomacy by 
examining three multimedia representations of USIA propaganda. First the USIA 
administered “Unfinished Business” exhibit on race relations at the 1958 World Fair. 
Second, a 2015 PBS documentary on the Jazz ambassadors to illustrate the context in 
which the international tours were played. Finally, the 1964 USIA-produced Nine from 
Little Rock documentary. 
 Consequently, I intend to contribute research analyzing the narrative-building 
processes employed by the early Cold War American propaganda and foreign policy 
efforts enacted through USIA. Currently, there is minimal research comparing the 
narrative building processes used by USIA in communication studies literature. 
Although, as a postcolonial propaganda scholar I am grappling with the ways in which 
propaganda is leveraged to crystallize public opinion. Consequently, I believe that the 
multilayered historical, political and cultural biases informing USIA’s propaganda 
enables an adroit lens for articulating imperial power dynamics between two global 
superpowers contesting for influence provides rich context for understanding propaganda. 
The Civil Rights Movement embarrassed the United States’ by damaging its image 
abroad as it incited democratic reforms in the United States. Investigating American Cold 
War government propaganda as expressions of foreign policy enables a critique of USIA 







Chapter 2: Decolonization across the Third World 
 
“Today this world dwells in a twilight zone between peace and war--a zone we call ‘cold 
war’... Let us talk about the wisdom and skill which we need to prosecute this “cold war” 
that infects nations around the globe… If we are to prevail in this “cold war” struggle for 
the minds and wills of humanity, we must do better.” -- Dwight D. Eisenhower, October 
8, 1952, San Francisco 
 
Beginning in 1953, USIA advanced a preexisting propaganda program installed in 
1950 called the “Crusade for Freedom.” According to Medhurst (1997), the Crusade for 
Freedom was a “long-term persuasive campaign that in many ways represent[ed] some of 
the essential features of Cold War discourse … spanning a period of more than fifteen 
years, making it one of the longest running campaigns of the Cold War” (p. 646). General 
Eisenhower informed the American people of The Crusade in an effort to fundraise for a 
government sponsored organization called Radio Free Europe (RFE) while disguising 
funding funneled by the CIA (Blum, 2004).  
This sponsorship is significant because American Cold War propaganda was 
synchronized across the US intelligence community, creating a technical propaganda 
network optimized for disseminating messages to wage psychological warfare. Though 
Ellul fretted that the American public were largely unaware of the violent ramifications 
of making democracy the object of American propaganda (1965). Democratic ideals, 
universal freedom and individual liberties were threatened by subversive ideas from the 
Soviets. The cultivation of rebellious ideas posed substantial risk to institutions 
throughout Western liberal democracies. The perceived threat to American political 
institutions and culture catalyzed the development of a governmental apparatus for 
psychological warfare which could defend American values and attack threatening 
institutions. As a result, government propagandists were responsible for interpreting 
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current events to corroborate an America prisoner’s dilemma.  According to Medhurst 
(1997), RFE was disguised when presented to American audiences as a “private, 
grassroots organization devoted to telling the truth to the captives behind the Iron 
Curtain” (p. 651). Advertisements created for American audiences described the 
organization as the invention of patriotic American civilians trying to help spread truthful 
information to European people. The United States government initiated the world’s most 
advanced propaganda operation to date to exploit the technological value of mass media 
communications technology, and its potential to control and influence societies. RFE 
simultaneously broadcasted messages to European audiences identifying itself as an 
“independent” European information source despite covertly operating on behalf of the 
US government. RFE marked the beginning of the Crusade for Freedom’s psychological 
operations as the first organized non-military effort to penetrate the Socialist bloc using 
radio waves. The National Security Council envisioned the battle for hearts and minds as 
a psychological contest requiring propaganda to socially engineer foreign public opinion. 
Psychological operations were given euphemisms like public relations, soft power and 
public diplomacy because each had slightly different connotations.  Due to the existential 
crisis framed by American National Security Council, the Soviet threat “compulsively” 
warranted “propaganda, economic warfare, direct action, sabotage, subversion and 
support for guerilla and resistance movements” against any and all forms of Communism 
worldwide (NSC 68; Marks, 2018, para. 7). The United States saw the existence of the 
Soviet Union as a threat to “[t]he free society [which] cherishes and protects as 
fundamental the rights of the minority against the will of a majority, because these rights 
are the inalienable rights of each and every individual” (NSC 68). In other words, liberal 
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democracy and capitalism were under siege, provoking a deliberate and aggressive 
reaction from the United States. As a result, selling the American way of life became the 
mission of information operations which Ellul would describe as “sociological 
propaganda” (Ellul, 1965). According to Ellul (1965) American sociological propaganda 
was designed to integrate other societal collectives into its hegemonic power structure. 
Specifically, American sociological propaganda would socially engineer world order to 
match an Imperialist ambition to attain overwhelming influence and control over 
international affairs by influencing the minds of large target groups to desire allegiance to 
the United States’ authority.  
Though RFE was a sibling organization to USIA, their approaches to 
disseminating information differed even as both conducted radio assaults carrying 
propaganda of all kinds (music, news, etc.) behind the Iron Curtain to Eastern European 
countries. USIA’s messages were designed to stabilize public support of pro-American 
political organizations. RFE’s messages were designed to destabilize public support of 
eastern European satellite governments and were not attributed to the United States. 
According to Medhurst (1997) this campaign provided “(1) a rhetorical response to an 
interrelated set of exigencies, (2) a strategic discourse that gave practical expression to a 
newly formulated doctrine of national security and (3) a tactical expression of the long-
term strategy for winning the Cold War” (p. 647). Moreover, the psychological 
operations were primed by the Truman Doctrine which “transformed the US relationship 
with the USSR from a case-by-case conflict into global confrontation” (Lucas, 1996, p. 
282). Accordingly, US propaganda efforts were directed towards fostering a US 
dominated world. By focusing on the diffusion of capitalist free market economic ideals 
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throughout the emerging decolonized world in addition to the Soviet satellite states, the 
US aimed to promote sociological development and modernization based upon conditions 
favoring American hegemonic power. From the perspective of the United States 
government, articulating global power into a US-led system was necessary to establish a 
stable world order post-WWII. If emerging nations did not follow American guidance 
then they would be susceptible to undue influence from the Soviets pursuing “world 
domination” thereby leading to violence and disruptions in the international trade of 
important raw materials, finished goods, political dissonance, among other consequences.  
The decision to augment propaganda programs was not made lightly. Eisenhower 
believed that the US had a moral imperative to conduct psychological warfare to avoid 
the human and material costs of conventional warfare (Osgood, 2006). Instead of 
spending $200 million on a single aircraft carrier, numerous psychological operations 
could be funded for a fraction of the cost (Striebert, 1955, p.557). Thus, psychological 
warfare enabled the US “to gain a victory without casualties, to win a contest that can 
quite literally save peace” (Stephen Benedict Papers, Box 4, 8 Oct 52). Contesting 
Communism pushed USIA’s psychological warfare to cultivate a modern “propaganda of 
integration” to dispel the Soviet inspired “agitation propaganda” (Ellul, 1965).  
Preserving peace in a global ideological struggle, “the propaganda of integration” is 
“propaganda of developed nations and characteristic of [their] civilization; in fact, it did 
not exist before the twentieth century. It is a propaganda of conformity” (Ellul, 1965 
p.74).  Integration propaganda hones stereotypes and beliefs, manipulating the framing of 
existing situations (especially crisis) with “aims at stabilizing the social body, at unifying 
and reinforcing it” (Ellul, 1965, p. 75). Integration propaganda uses objective tone when 
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reporting on current events to give a normative account of reality for long-term 
sociological conformity to a status quo. USIA’s founding strategic principles articulated 
the organization’s approach to propaganda as a subtle “weapon of political warfare” to 
counter competing interests from the USSR (Streibert, 1954, p. 1763). Furthermore, 
USIA’s method for influencing public opinion depended upon the perpetuation of “the 
myth of progress” designed to appeal to the hearts and minds of target audiences. 
Specifically, USIA details that  
the content of our [USIA] operations—our “message”—must serve our special 
political warfare needs as well as our generalized long-term mission directly and 
concurrently … To these ends, a sharply limited number of Global Themes will 
be developed and will provide the central and authoritative statement of our 
message for all areas and all media. These themes are not intended to serve as 
slogans, to be proclaimed as our message, or to be presented primarily as overt or 
explicit statements. They are statements of the views which we desire to see our 
audiences hold. In influencing them to hold these views we will most frequently 
be effective largely through indirection, through allowing the inference to appear 
as the inevitable conclusion to which audiences are impelled by their own 
interests, circumstances, and special characteristics. (Streibert, 1954, p. 1771) 
Persuasive messages were crafted to optimize the cognitive participation of target 
audiences. Once USIA created messages which aligned with their global themes the 
ensuing content was primed to leave lasting impressions upon its audiences.  Through 
indirection, slowly USIA’s propaganda messages would hit its target’s subconscious 
faculties to inculcate American cultural assumptions into target public. Aligning with 
 48 
Bernaysian theories on crowd mentalities, the group subconscious was a malleable mass 
in need of domination (Bernays, 1928, p.1). Ideally USIA’s audiences would recognize 
their psychological aspirations and desires as strongly aligned with the foreign policy 
interests of the US. This is important because USIA’s propaganda aimed to convince 
foreign audiences to feel that their desires for modernization, political and cultural 
freedoms would be fulfilled by aligning with the US. To accomplish this goal, USIA’s 
messages featured narrative elements optimized to cultivate thoughts and strong feelings 
of anti-Communism into global common sense. In order to accomplish this goal, the first 
“Global Theme” sought to “Unite the free world in order to reduce the Communist threat 
without war.” (Streibert, 1954, p. 1773). In the beginning of USIA’s propaganda 
campaigns, the “free world” was limited to Asia and Europe, which were “present[ed] as 
interdependent parts of a whole united in basic interests, to avoid the danger of a two-
front psychological war” (Streibert, 1954, p. 1773). USIA was engaged in warfare. The 
Agency was guided by the idea that American propaganda needs to conquer the minds of 
the world.  USIA emphasized solidarity based upon a framework of shared “legitimate” 
interests, and values with a “free world entity” to “prevent the growth of neutralist and 
third-force sentiment” (Streibert, 1954, p. 1773). However, the “free world” took notice 
of the political reality in the United States where the Civil Rights Movement protested 
against injustice sustained by the American ideological system. Naturally then USIA’s 
messages of unity forced the organization to craft an American story that would 
incentivize other nations to join its international coalition against communism. Over time 
USIA’s strategy evolved to accommodate a larger number of “free world” actors as 
volatile political power structures across the globe disturbed colonial hegemonies. Thus, 
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the initial “Global Theme” would later be applied throughout European, African, Asian 
and Latin American contexts. USIA was given a mammoth task to exploit the “myth of 
perpetual progress” by framing America’s story in a context favorable for both foreign 
and domestic US policies. This era witnessed waves of decolonization and USIA wanted 
to ensure that the free world understood America’s stance on global trends. Though 
decolonization and civil rights posed different rhetorical problems for USIA. 
Decolonization posed threats by adding more global actors with whom relationships 
needed to be articulated. The configuration of international power relations affected 
ideological morale, valuable markets, resources and cultural prestige. The US wanted to 
maintain existing alliances with Western European actors while simultaneously building 
relationships with Third World nations resisting oppression and subjugation. Moreover, 
America wanted to be the nation that set the global trends and although the US was 
racially segregated it was attempting to unite the free world against the Soviet Union. 
American foreign and domestic policies were not coherent on the issue of racism thus the 
propaganda programs had to juggle mixed messages. On the one hand, USIA fashioned 
America as a representative of “universal freedom” to influence other nation-states to 
adopts its cultural values, economic values, political values etc. Highlighting the 
American values builds upon a key premise of soft power. Although on the other hand, 
the Civil Rights Movement demonstrated the disparity in the ideological system USIA 
was exporting. African-American citizens protesting the ills of white supremacy 
embedded in American culture challenged the status quo by critiquing American values. 
According to Hayden (2011) “soft power ultimately rests on the assumption that certain 
qualities can be translated into international influence that do not involve traditional 
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material components of coercive power behaviors” (p. 35).  So, USIA recognized the 
significance of acknowledging the Civil Rights movement. The trick was to mold the 
Civil Rights movement into a narrative that could enhance the public perception of 
American virtues. 
US Afro-Asian Foreign Policy  
 USIA developed content for nations in the Third World while keeping in mind 
that the US government wanted to maintain “free world” access to the mineral deposits 
and geographically strategic locations held by the young nations. Free world countries 
were rhetorically comprised of the First World Western bloc and Third World neutral 
countries to draw a stark contrast with oppressed countries in the Second World Soviet 
Bloc. Consequently, USIA prioritized the opinions and attitudes of these subjects as 
Third World nations began gaining autonomy on the world stage. Cultural diplomacy 
scholar Von Eschen (2004) acknowledges that “US officials pursued a self-conscious 
campaign against worldwide criticism of US racism, striving to build cordial relations 
with new African and Asian states” (p. 4) because the US government felt that 
ideological “conflict would be played out in the nonaligned and newly emerging nations 
of the Middle East, Asia and Africa” rather than on the home front (p. 7). As a result, the 
US waged ideological warfare to bolster prestige on the global stage.  
 One of the major contingencies threatening US prestige was a trend towards 
political neutralism (Jackson Committee, 1953b). The 1955 National Intelligence 
Estimate highlighted the trends threatening an American dominated “Free World” listing 
“Neutralism” as the chief concern acknowledging,  
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One of the most dangerous political trends over the next several years will 
probably be a further blurring of the lines which have divided the Communist and 
non-Communist worlds. Many Free World countries embarked on a policy of 
defensive alliances less because of ideological convictions than because of the 
danger of general war or [Soviet] Bloc local aggression. The apparent abatement 
of this danger, if the Bloc persists in a convincing demonstration of peaceful 
intent, may result in increasing neutralism and a trend toward a greater number of 
uncommitted states. (Department of State, 1955 p. 144) 
This threat assumes that political non-alignment from ideologically diverse countries is 
an inherently hostile gesture against the American-led Free World. From a strategic 
foreign policy standpoint, political non-alignment from organized supranational blocs 
threatened to weaken the American-led global alliance. In other words, if a nation did not 
align politically with the US then they were inherently opposing the US. Consequently, 
for USIA, narratives of international relations emphasizing cooperation between 
ideologically diverse nations were pushed aside in favor of a dual narrative describing a 
world comprised of either democratic capitalists or totalitarian communists (Department 
of State, 1955). To illustrate the strategic logic applied to non-aligned nations, the 1953 
National Intelligence Estimate report highlighted the following trends: 
1) The strategic importance of Tropical Africa arises chiefly from its supply of such 
materials as uranium, cobalt, diamonds, and columbite; from its location with 
respect to sea and air lanes in the South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and Red Sea 
areas; and from its potential as a site for LOC [Line of Communication], staging, 
and training facilities. 
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2) The chief problem in Tropical Africa is that increasing African discontent and 
demands for self-government, although varying widely in different colonial 
dependencies, will gradually weaken European control and pose a threat to 
Western access to Tropical Africa’s strategic resources. Over a long period there 
will almost certainly be an uneven and uneasy transition from colonial to self-
rule.  
3) Despite the present weakness of the Communists, their influence and numerical 
strength will increase. As African unrest grows, various African groups are likely 
to welcome assistance from any quarter. Communist efforts in the long run 
probably will have greatest effect upon the more advanced Africans—young 
intellectuals, nationalist activists, and labor group members—to whom 
Communism  might appear as an aid in weakening European control. (US State 
Department, 1953, National intelligence estimate, p. 72) 
Non-European nations were viewed with trepidation in the battle for ideological 
hegemony over political and cultural systems throughout the free world. The US wants to 
secure control over the non-European nations since colonial relationships favorable to the 
US were jeopardized by unrest in the Third World. As a result, USIA crafted narratives 
about the US that demonstrated moral greatness and economic prosperity to champion 
progressive American idealism. The typical messages encouraged recipients to think 
about the success of the American Negro in conjunction with the industrialization of 
American society. In this tale the American democratic capitalistic system helped 
downtrodden peoples like the American Negro pursue lasting political, economic and 
social reforms. 
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 This narrative angle required creating a framework depicting the decline of 
American racism and white supremacy. Additionally, according to Krenn (1996), 
American democracy was framed as “a society in [controlled] ferment,” and American 
citizens were to be portrayed as “dynamic, energetic, impatient and restless for change,” 
as well as “committed to a constant, unremitting search for an improved way of life” 
(p.595). This image illustrated an American society catalyzed by individuals driven 
towards the pursuit of perpetual progress, wealth, prosperity and opportunity. These 
pursuits were all supposed to be made available through American constitutional rights. 
The impetus for change was not limited to government mandates – instead constant 
demand for change flowing from individuals would transform into democratic coalitions 
formed to enact the will of the people. 
 In this narrative, Jim Crow America was absolved of accusations of brutality by 
framing racial violence as a societal anomaly. Displays of violence were underplayed to 
suggest that American society was more tolerant than the international media may let on 
in their reporting. Mass international audiences skeptically watched the conditions of 
Black Americans as a litmus test to evaluate the strength of the American society. In so 
doing, global audiences compared American governmental propaganda with the reality 
described through international news coverage. This argument supported balancing 
sensational news stories of American social turbulence within a context of progressive 
growth. This Cold War propaganda strategy effectively aids colorblind, “post-race 
rhetoric” that deflects societal critiques by way of diversion (Ono, 2010). Displays of 
violence were regarded as ancient prejudices constantly dwindling in strength. This 
approach to USIA propaganda accompanied intelligence community forecasts projecting 
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an international decline in European control and white supremacy if European colonial 
governments were not able to sufficiently explain the mutually beneficial aspects of 
colonial relationships.  Now the US could position itself as a supporter of independence 
movements through its acknowledgement that racially based hegemonies were in 
remission.   
  Discontentment and faltering European prestige on the world stage gives 
significance to the framing of the chief problem in the African context furthermore, 
African appeals for self-governance jeopardized existing corporate and government 
relations amongst the countries in the Western Free World. This situation resounded 
across the globe representing a key issue for US relations with Asia and Latin America as 
well. The threat of Communism justifies the rationale for negatively viewing movements 
towards self-governance. In a global struggle for power, the intelligence community 
feared that Africans facing oppression would welcome support from anyone willing to 
offer such support. Unfortunately for the US, this meant that emerging leaders across 
Africa might build relationships with the Soviet Union. Since the US and the USSR were 
opponents in a global clash developing a positive relationship with the Soviet 
supranational faction would almost undoubtedly stifle existing business and politically 
organized relationships built between Western powers. The same logic prevailed over US 
relations with Asia and Latin America. Furthermore, the 1957 National Security Council 
Report on sub-Saharan Africa supplements the post-race logic at work, by articulating 
how; “US influence is restricted by the extremely distorted picture Africans have been 
given concerning the race problem in the United States”, the policy guidance continues 
calling for “emphasiz[ing] US progress in the field of race relations through all available 
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media” (National Security Council, 1957a). The distorted picture idea suggested that 
America was not adequately depicted as a progressive society. American was portrayed by 
the Soviets as a “viciously racist nation, infested with members of the Ku Klux Klan and 
deserving grave suspicions from people of color” (Krenn, 2006, p.84). Though this image 
was exaggerated, it held enough truth to encourage cynicism and distrust of America 
amongst non-European audiences. This is where USIA came into play. By serving as the 
intermediary for all information activities and US propaganda efforts, USIA worked to put 
race relations into balance for international audiences with three key aspects to the 
rhetorical strategy 1) emphasize progress, 2) minimize the harm and 3) frame democracy 
as redemptive. The new context was meant to suggest that racial disparity in the United 
States was a minor issue getting better by the day. Moreover, by comparing the societal 
conditions experienced by the American Negro from the early 1900s to the 1950s, the 
balanced context suggested that slowly but surely the American democratic system would 
lead to significant positive gains for race relations. In most cases this meant bolstering a 
“story of redemption” featuring “democracy as a system of government [that] was the 
vehicle for national reconciliation” (Dudziak, 2000, p.49). In plain terms, racial disparity 
needed to be understood within a broader more progressive context. Rearticulating racial 
violence as a product of social change. For example, in 1957 USIA’s strategy for 
responding to international criticism was described in a memorandum for a staff report for 
the president: 
As the Soviet propaganda step up their attacks on ‘racial terror’ in the United 
States following recent developments in Little Rock, USIA media are attempting 
to minimize damage by summarizing anti-integration events on a factual basis, 
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supplying facts whenever possible to balance adverse sensational items, quoting 
editorials and official statements which indicates steady determined progress 
toward integration, and informally suggesting to friendly editors possible 
constructive treatment. (Dudziak, 2000, p. 142) 
In the best-case scenario, emphasizing progress through redemption may be well 
intentioned. Although propagating a harmonious image of racial progress to contextualize 
Jim Crow America era is disingenuous at best and coercive at worst. Namely, because 
minimizing damage generated by monumental events like Little Rock obscures the 
structural nature of the problem at hand in favor of highlighting remedies to a few 
symptoms of a divisive racial relations. 
  As the self-proclaimed moral leader of the free world, the US through the 
messaging efforts of USIA conveyed convenient truths about the United States through its 
work. In order to strengthen the American image abroad, USIA needed to understand the 
cultural context it was entering. As a result, the president’s Committee on International 
Information Activities, informally called the Jackson committee, articulated strategies 
used by the Soviets when portraying itself on the global stage,  
The foreign communist parties have sought, often with much success, to identify 
themselves, according to local conditions, as the working-class party, the anti-
imperialistic party or the anti-discrimination party. The Soviet Union has moved 
to exploit discontent through its foreign communist apparatus. Its readiness to 
create conditions of anarchy as a preliminary to seizing power is in itself an 
important advantage in the conflict. (Report to the President by the President’s 
Committee on International Information Activities, 1953a, p. 1806) 
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The foreign communist apparatus loosely refers to left-leaning political parties in foreign 
countries. Accentuating messages of peaceful intentions, Soviet propagandists wanted to 
identify with oppressed groups to incite the types of revolutions prophesized by Marx 
which preceded the development of societal development towards communist utopias and 
build coalitional strength across the world. Accordingly the Jackson Committee built its 
assumptions around the premise that the Soviet’s real geopolitical motivations were 
geared towards world domination. USIA content was created to weaken Soviet narratives 
by refuting the arguments raised with “information” i.e., propaganda to put the record 
straight while bolstering the American image. Consequently, organized coalitions 
throughout the Third World that sympathized or embraced socialist political values risked 
being attacked as anti-American communist movements.  
Non-alignment and anticolonial movements  
 Framing non-alignment as a global threat effectively squashed international non-
partisanship. As a result, emerging nations in the Third World were seemingly coerced 
into a false dichotomy between supporting either Capitalist American Democracy or the 
Socialist Soviet Union. Political commentary that criticized the United States and 
government policies designed without the United States consent were framed as threats to 
US national security. USIA discovered the threats through public opinion polls and focus 
groups in order to strategically counter harmful messages. Political non-alignment was 
construed as a Communist movement. As a result, USIA enacted America’s foreign 
policy goals in direct opposition to universal freedom in favor of contingent freedom to 
support a global structure favoring white supremacy. Meaning that the United States 
foreign policy sought to prolong an international political system favorable to 
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exploitative hegemonic relationships. The US wanted to place itself at the head of the 
world which affected its attitude towards international relations. Since the Soviets 
rhetorically aligned themselves with politically disenfranchised groups. The US 
government often conflated nationalism, populism and communism. Movements towards 
self-governance across the Third World risked the loss of natural resources acquired 
through Western European colonial exploitation. Commenting on the momentum of 
African political movements the 1957 National Security Council (NSC) reported that,  
Premature independence would be as harmful to our interests in Africa as would 
be a continuation of nineteenth century colonialism, and we must tailor our 
policies to the capabilities and needs of each particular area as well as to our over-
all relations with the metropolitan [Western European] power concerned 
(National Security Council, 1957a).  
So, policy guidance advocated for contingent freedom when considering African 
interests. Contingent because the US needed to approve of decisions before they were 
regarded as legitimate. Nineteenth century colonialism needed to be amended for 
twentieth century conditions. The fear of losing control of valuable resources in Africa 
was bad enough, however, the fear of losing valuable resources to the Soviet Union was 
unbearable. Consequently, the end results led to proxy wars fought in Korea, Vietnam, 
and Afghanistan to name a few salient conflicts across the Cold War period. USIA’s 
stated objectives, mentioned on page 12, concerned using information activities to build 
mutually beneficial relationships while dispelling Soviet influence.  
Although the leaders of the anticolonial movements throughout the Third World 
profoundly influenced international relations during the Cold War by advocating for 
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political non-alignment while reflecting on the operations conducted on behalf of US and 
Soviet foreign policy. Simultaneously anti-colonial movements inspired a tremendous 
amount of social activism in the United States from Civil Rights advocates inspiring and 
being inspired from the appeals to democratic engagement (McMahon, 2013). During the 
1950s through the 1960s, the concept of the “Third World” excited many of the leaders 
pursuing postcolonial relations with the world. The Third World concept aligned a 
heterogenous group of nations into a coherent bloc which suggested the potential for 
global solidarity through ideological coalitions against tyranny, racism and white 
supremacy in any form (Westad, 2013). One of the most notable demonstrations of Third 
World solidarity occurred at the Bandung Conference of 1955, which brought 29 
independent and non-aligned African and Asian countries together to call for “racial 
solidarity, social justice, and an end to all forms of imperial control” (McMahon, 2013 p. 
5). This event was blacklisted by the US State Department due to association with the 
alarming global trends of “nationalism” and “neutralism” (Walker, 2018) as the US 
government feared that this conference would feature Afro-Asian leaders lambasting the 
United States and other Western democracies. Among the countries championing strong 
trends towards nationalism and neutralism was Britain’s Gold Coast colony undergoing 
dramatic political reformation. 
In 1957 the Gold Coast became the first African colony to gain political 
independence from a European power, ultimately transforming into what is now the 
Republic of Ghana. This historical moment is significant because under the leadership of 
anti-colonial advocate, President Kwame Nkrumah, this transfer of political power from a 
British Commonwealth colony to an independent Republic marked the first of many 
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experiments for independent African heads of state. In a 1958 speech given in New York 
City one year after Ghana gained independence, Kwame Nkrumah described the 
inspiration for Ghanaian non-alignment  
it is not indifference that leads to a policy of non-alignment … it is our belief that 
international blocs and rivalries exacerbate and do not solve disputes and that we 
must be free to judge issues on their merits and to look for solutions that are just 
and peaceful, irrespective of the power involved. We do not wish to be in the 
position of condoning imperialism or aggression from any quarter (McMahon, 
2013, p. 9) 
Nkrumah serves as an exemplar for representing the non-alignment movement because 
his charismatic personality and rhetoric paved the way for his theories on postcolonial 
and neocolonial international relations. Additionally, Nkrumah wrote extensively and 
chronicled his experience with USIA’s activities describing them as consistent with a 
“neocolonial project” designed to exploit newly decolonized nations (Nkrumah, 1974). 
As a proponent of international political non-alignment, Nkrumah feared that the United 
States had employed psychological warfare on nations practicing political non-alignment 
from the major political alliances (McMahon, 2013). Hindsight shows that Nkrumah’s 
fears were grounded in the operations of the intelligence community. US propaganda had 
to tactfully operate with international audiences in a manner optimized to deflate negative 
attacks from foreign propaganda.   
State Department and USIA executives prioritized securing support for foreign 
policy positions over the cultivation of friendships, noting that “while friendship for the 
United States may be a useful means of persuasion, it is not in itself a necessary objective 
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of our propaganda efforts.” (USIA, 1953, p.1869). Nkrumah contends that in a world 
with nuclear weapons, seeking to deter total war, economic and cultural relationships 
between nations gain greater significance as instruments of control in neocolonial power 
structures (Nkrumah, 1974). His argument assumes that economic relationships are 
impacted through trade and sanctions, although prestige and cultural relationships are 
influenced by public opinion by the biases within information circulating throughout a 
society (e.g. radio broadcasts, libraries, music). Thus, to vie for advantageous cultural and 
economic relations, nations will steadily increase their usage of propaganda as a 
mechanism of foreign political and cultural manipulation, especially in a technologically 
advanced world with greater ability to disseminate information widely and evaluate 
public. 
 Nkrumah contends that hegemonic powers depend upon propaganda as a means 
of perpetuating existing power structures by exerting pressure via political warfare. For 
example, if the US didn’t favor government it might destabilize it within, back a coup 
d’état, flood the public of a country with misinformation or disinformation which could 
corroborate governmental intervention. So if a nation looked too communist in its 
political maneuvering then that could warrant American intervention. Consequently, 
political interference through propaganda became a powerful weapons for statecraft. 
Nkrumah (1965) viewed the United States as “foremost among the neo-colonialists … 
which has long exercised its power in Latin America [often in defense of American 
enterprise]” (p.269). In America’s case, hostile targets were individuals or groups 
perceived as anti-American, communist or socialist because they hindered American 
cultural and political hegemony. In a landmark 1965 book title Neocolonialism: The Last 
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Stage of Imperialism, Nkrumah describes the political economy of Ghana while 
condemning Western European nations and the US for pursuing “neocolonial” projects. 
Nkrumah (1974) contends that  
The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, 
independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In 
reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from the 
outside. (p. ix) 
In other words, neocolonialism is a socio-political and economic hegemonic device 
which describes an exploitative phenomenon in which a nation effectively has second-
class sovereignty and “is not master of its own destiny” (Nkrumah, 1974, p. x). This 
phenomenon is reified through the use of psychological warfare to undermine public faith 
in government or to reinforce control over narratives in the public sphere. This frontline 
of the Cold War battles for the hearts and minds of the Third World sanctioned open 
limited warfare and deliberate attempts to coerce public opinion (McMahon, 2013).  For 
example, Nkrumah (1965) illustrates situations within continental Africa in which the 
United States restricted both countries’ diplomatic relationships to control the flow of 
information noting, 
The American government backs the United States Information Agency through 
its direct pressures on developing nations. To ensure its agency a complete 
monopoly in propaganda, for instance many agreements for economic co-
operation offered by the US include a demand that Americans be granted 
preferential rights to disseminate information [barring interference from sources 
deemed as hostile to the US] (p. 250). 
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Considering that USIA propaganda was devised as weapon for psychological warfare, it 
bears importance to understand the organizational procedure used to support US national 
security imperatives. Non-alignment and anti-colonial political movements worked in 
tandem challenging systems of oppression across the Third World. USIA labored to 
persuade non-aligned parties to side with the US to prevent them from being manipulated 
by the Soviets. US foreign policy was frames in an us versus them binary that eliminated 
the option of political neutrality. 
Development of gray activities 
 Before executing any operations, USIA directors collaborated with the State 
Departments’ Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), which later became the Operations 
Coordinating Board (OCB), to determine the organizations’ strategic priorities guiding 
overt and overt operations (Operations Coordinating Board, 1954). According to plans 
from the PSB, 
America's propaganda program was to become the center for a ‘psychological 
warfare offensive’ against the Soviet Union. This offensive would exploit all 
available propaganda channels to explicate the ‘meaning and purposes’ of 
presidential ‘initiatives’ and ‘objectives’ in a positive manner. (Parry-Giles, 1994, 
p. 269) 
USIA acted in the interests of American foreign policy, which yearned to slow the 
growth of International Communism ideologically, economically and militarily (Holly & 
Patterson, (n.d.), p. 476). To optimize message impact, the policy guidance for USIA 
included a model which determined that majority of USIA messages should be 
unattributed unless “attribution is an asset” (Jackson Committee, 1953a, p. 1841). 
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Therefore, USIA content was designed to be unattributed unless absolutely necessary to 
leverage the American image through its available channels. USIA information was not 
anonymous but rather it was attributed to sources other than USIA. Following the active 
National Security Council’s directive on covert operations, USIA’s role was defined in 
relation with the CIA (President’s Committee on International Information Activities, 
1953). The CIA handled explicitly covert propaganda which directly prompted political 
subversion, insurrection and resistance. These activities would undermine the image of 
tolerance the US had built therefore they were done in secret. USIA handled overt 
propaganda which could be attributed to the US government. The Jackson Committee 
regarded propaganda as a psychological weapon used to bias international audiences 
towards a cultural narrative of the world favorable to US foreign policy. To achieve this 
goal, content was segmented based on identified audience groups to send messages 
through the most appropriate channels. As a result, information activities were broken 
into three categories of operations to fulfill the directives of the intelligence community. 
The categories included “white activities”, “gray activities” and “black activities” which 
were labeled on a greyscale to distinguish good from necessary evils.  
 Some narratives were outwardly approved by the State Department and thus 
USIA was comfortable acknowledging and claiming them on the international stage. The 
first category is comprised of white activities which were defined as operations that posed 
no threat to the image of the United States and were therefore boldly attributed directly to 
the United States. White activities may report on major pieces of US legislation like 
Brown v. Board of education to demonstrate the American progress in the area of race 
relations. The second category is comprised of gray activities which are unattributed yet 
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attributable to the US government. In much the same way that news releases are 
unattributed but nonetheless attributable to the organizations that produce them. These 
quasi-covert operations operated in a limbo space to create psychological distance 
between the messages and their governmental origins to appeal to audiences that are 
more receptive to information that appears to be coming from non-official American 
sources.  The OCB (1954) explains the strategic purposes of unattributed yet attributable 
information by acknowledging,  
The true source [US Government] is not revealed to the target audience. The 
activity engaged in plausibly appears to emanate from a non-official American 
source, or an indigenous, non-hostile source, or there may be no attribution 
Gray is that information whose content is such that the effect will be increased if 
the hand of the US Government and in some cases any American participation are 
not revealed. It is simply a means for the US to present viewpoints which are in 
the interest of US foreign policy, but which will be acceptable or more acceptable 
to the intended target audience than will an official government statement. (p. 
503) 
The distinction between content which gray and white can only be understood after 
acknowledging the final category of American psychological operations, black activities. 
The last type of psychological operations represented the most deceptive information 
operations and were defined as follows: 
The activity engaged in appears to emanate from a source (government, party, 
group, organization, person) usually hostile in nature. The interest of the US 
Government is concealed and the US Government would deny responsibility. The 
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content may be partially or completely fabricated, but that which is fabricated is 
made to appear credible to the target audience. Black activity is also usually 
designed to cause embarrassment to the ostensible source or to force the 
ostensible source to take action against its will. (OCB, 1954, p. 503) 
Notable failed black operations include the Bay of Pigs and the U-2 “weather plane” 
incident during the 1960s. For the most part, USIA ran successful black operations 
avoiding messy public missteps, and created an impressive blueprint for modern tactical 
propaganda. On the other levels, USIA handled content production to accomplish the 
following: “creating and exploiting troublesome problems for International Communism” 
fracturing relationships between the USSR its allies, “discrediting the prestige and 
ideology of International Communism”, destabilizing pro-communist political 
organizations in the free world, reducing communist influence around the world, 
bolstering the mutual interests between US and other nations to “strengthen the 
orientation toward the US”, and finally to “develop underground resistance and facilitate 
covert and guerrilla operations and ensure availability of those forces in the event of war, 
including wherever practicable provisions of a base upon which the military may expand 
these forces in time of war within acting theaters of operations as well as provision for 
stay-behind assets and escape and evasion facilities” in areas threatened by communism 
(Office of the Historian, n.d., p. 746). 
 These goals provided a path to maturity for the young USIA transforming into a 
sophisticated instrument of US foreign policy by defining the parameters between white, 
gray and black activities. Values associated with “International Communism” were 
subject to brutal attacks designed to delegitimize socialist aspirations. Growth in the 
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“Free World” was only supported if states pledged allegiance to a permanent US-led 
Western coalition. In a psychological framework where the US is heralded as the 
protector of universal freedom, justice and truth, enemies to the US are also enemies to 
global peace. As a result, international relationships between states sympathetic to 
communist values and ideas were intentionally stifled to protect American national 
security which will be illustrated in the next section.  
Gray activities in the Guatemalan Coup D’etat 
 In 1953 USIA’s first major gray activities involved supporting the CIA’s plot to 
overthrow the first democratically elected Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz. 
President Arbenz passed a revolutionary land reform bill, “Decree 900”, which 
expropriated and redistributed uncultivated land larger than 223 acres from private 
landowners to empower poor land laborers to stimulate the agrarian-economy (Holly, & 
Patterson, (n.d.), p. xxvi). This land nationalization effort was Arbenz’ flagship campaign 
proposal. Once enacted the reform impacted 40% of land owned by the American United 
Fruit Company (UFC) which had built a virtual empire across Central America building 
roads, railroads, communications infrastructure, and ports to sustain its tropical fruit 
value chain. Arbenz’s decree stated that impacted property owners would be 
compensated with the value self-listed on the company’s personal tax forms.  
 This political move threatened UFC’s long-term growth so they called upon 
public relations expert Edward Bernays to resolve their issue. On behalf of UFC, Bernays 
decided to brand Guatemala as a communist satellite state threatening the stability of the 
region. This narrative caught the attention of the State Department and the CIA. By 
framing the Guatemalan land reform legislation as the first steps towards a totalitarian 
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government Bernays’ leveraged American anti-communist sentiments to shield the 
business interests of UFC. Subsequently, the National Security Council State 
Department’s authorized the CIA to conduct a psychological and paramilitary campaign 
(Osgood, 2006). USIA quickly supported its sister agency with “an aggressive 
information effort, utilizing all available resources to expose and discredit the Arbenz 
regime as communist dominated and to dramatize the threat Guatemala posed to the 
peace and security of the hemisphere” (Osgood, 2006, p. 147). Due to the foreign policy 
of containment, Guatemala quickly went from a little discussed Central American 
country an anti-American communist threat 2000 miles from the US southern border.  
While the CIA prepared to oust Arbenz through a coup d’état, USIA used intelligence 
gathered by its agents plus information from the CIA and the State Department to turn 
Latin American public opinion against Arbenz. In the months leading up to the coup 
USIA “prepared more than 200 articles and scripts for press and radio placement, 
distributed 27,000 anticommunist cartoons and posters and 100,000 copies of the 
pamphlet ‘Chronology of Communism in Guatemala’ throughout Latin America” 
(Osgood, 2006, p. 147). USIA’s grey and white activities allowed the CIA, State 
Department and Congress to exert economic and diplomatic pressure against Arbenz, 
subvert and/or defect Army and political leaders from Arbenz’ administration and stop 
the flow of military aid to Guatemala while increasing military aid to its neighbors.  
 This cross-agency initiative was given the codename “PBSuccess.” One of the 
major propaganda ploys devised by the CIA and publicized by USIA involved 
deliberately planting a seized cache of Soviet weapons in Guatemala while arranging for 
extensive publicity of the subsequent discovery (Central Intelligence Agency, 1975). The 
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fabrication of a faux-Soviet arms delivery was aborted due to a coincidental shipment of 
Polish weapons. In addition, 
The Agency [USIA] cooperated with a task force during the Guatemalan crisis in 
selecting documentary material, through the cooperation of the new anti-
communist government, which was used in the output of the Agency. At the time 
of, and subsequent to the Guatemalan Revolution, the Agency sent guidances, 
books, pamphlets, press and radio commentaries and stories to the field to enable 
field personnel to understand and then publicize the extent of Moscow ties to 
the Arbenz regime and elsewhere in Latin America (Operations Coordinating 
Board, 1955, p.108). 
Gray activities were meant to legitimize aggressive black activities in the case that they 
were uncovered. The Guatemalan example demonstrates just one example of the function 
the gray activities had during the Cold War. Medhurst (1997) elaborated on the 
application of US gray activities during the Cold War, acknowledging that   
often the public rhetoric was a public relations front for secret, CIA-assisted 
missions, sometimes of questionable legal and/or moral probity. Focus on the 
public rhetoric functioned to divert audience attention from such messy covert 
actions as Iran, Guatemala, and later, in a spectacular case of public failure, the U-
2 affair. (p. 659) 
USIA was tasked with curbing neutralism and diminishing the strength of communism 
which encouraged sharp us-versus-them rhetoric. In this framework, the strength and 
success of the “free world” depended on the failure of the Soviet Union and any nations 
that adopted socialist political orientations. Therefore, USIA propaganda staunchly 
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advocated against Communism to highlight the moral significance of taking sides in a 
clash of global titans. The US perceived a power vacuum forming in the Third World and 
responded with psychological warfare when threatened. The US government saw allies 
and foes, leaving no room for neutrality from sovereign nations (Truman, 1950).  
 It is in this ambivalent and anxious political climate that USIA developed its 
propaganda and supported the Guatemalan coup d’etat which resulted in the repeal of 
Arbenz’s land reform bill. As evidenced in this scenario, portraying the US in a positive 
light required casting adversaries in menacing shadows using national security concerns 
as the justification for regime changes. USIA distorted the truth in its gray activities 
during the Guatemalan escapade to support offensive CIA operations. Although USIA’s 
propaganda focused on explaining American race relations were prompted as defensive 
countermeasures against Soviet agitation propaganda shown to foreign audiences. 
Consequently, USIA’s overt Civil Rights propaganda fell into the white activities 
category which serves a more defensive role for US foreign policy strategy. Within this 
context of defensive and offensive information activities supporting American 
psychological warfare campaigns, the remainder of the project will explore how USIA’s 
overt propaganda was used to address race relations and respond to the Civil Rights 
Movement.  To begin unpacking this component of USIA’s activities the next section 
will address USIA’s involvement in the 1958 World Fair.  
1958 World Fair/Unfinished Business 
  In 1954, the US government was invited to participate in the 1958 World Fair. 
The first since the conclusion of WWII, the event was held in Brussels, Belgium. USIA 
was involved in thematic planning and exhibition development for the US in the years 
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leading up to the event.  The general theme of the exhibition focused on the “importance 
of man [sic] in a technological world” encapsulated in the slogan “A World View: A New 
Humanism” (Cullman, 1958, p. 1). The Eisenhower administration acknowledged a 
relationship between America’s race relations and international diplomacy because 
domestic and international scrutiny over American racism diminished American prestige. 
Domestically the Civil Rights movement generated outspoken criticisms of American 
society and American news coverage was filled with racist statements, racial stereotypes 
and stories about African-Americans being denied voting rights, access to public facilities 
and horrific accounts of violence. Then externally, international news coverage picked up 
the same stories and Soviet propaganda often amplified information which embarrassed 
the American government. American race relations became a diplomatic issue because in 
the eyes of the world, the condition of African-Americans signified America’s 
commitment to practicing what it preached as the leader of the “free world” (Osgood, 
2006, p.84). Thus, the World Fair provided an opportunity to set the record straight. 
Gathering some of the best elements of American culture, USIA aimed to curate an 
impactful memorable experience for Fair attendees.  The US wanted audiences to feel as if 
they had been transported to the US (Krenn, 1996, p. 595) and undertook efforts to utilize 
the American exhibition as a vehicle to deliver the “American way of life” to European 
audiences (Krenn, 1996, p.592). This way of life entailed fantastic grocery stores filled 
with abundant produce, showcasing the industrial factories producing goods for the 
country, farming prowess, artistic and cultural modernity. Chosen exhibits illustrated 
automotive ingenuity, models of American homes, voting machines, crafts, a bookshop, a 
children’s museum, fine arts, an American restaurant, in addition to performances of 
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musicals, dramas, operas, and dance programs would be performed (Krenn, 1996).  The 
venue served as an excellent opportunity to exhibit the strength of American society by 
highlighting cultural prowess, industrial ingenuity and America’s “commitment to 
equality and justice for all human beings, including its African American citizens” (Krenn, 
1996, p.592).  
  USIA expected stiff competition from the Soviets, considering the USSR’s 
ongoing “peace offensive” campaign which, according to Castillo (2010), “used 
international trade fairs to portray Communism as technologically and economically 
advanced. Soviet bloc nations staged 60 foreign exhibitions in 1954, and 170 the 
following year” (p. 118). All of these exhibitions gave the USSR platforms to hone their 
messaging in international fairs so USIA acknowledged Soviets as seasoned veterans 
when it came to leveraging trade fairs as propaganda. Knowing this, USIA and the State 
Department understood the world fairs as a battleground upon which ideological wars 
were fought. There are minimal constraints for the form which propaganda can take. In 
fact, Eisenhower acknowledged the clandestine nature of his activities, noting “the hand of 
government must be carefully concealed, and in some cases, I should say, wholly 
eliminated” when conducting psychological warfare” (Castillo, 2010, p. 118). This 
philosophy manifested into a collaboration between the USIA and the US Advertising 
Council to create “People’s Capitalism”, a countermeasure designed to portray the 
American capitalist system as the catalyst for fostering a classless, productive, and 
prosperous society (National Security Council, 1957b). Describing the American 
economic system in this manner strategically helped refute Marxist-Leninist economic 
theories. People’s Capitalism was featured prominently throughout the American 
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presentation at the World Fair to articulate how American society socially benefits from 
capitalism (New York Times, 1956a). Arguing that American neoliberal ideals motivated 
entrepreneurship and enabled the United States to cultivate a classless society while 
shifting away from exploitative models of colonial capitalism. The “people’s capitalism” 
message used numerous facets of the Cold War American culture society including post-
war economic prosperity, mass-produced housing developments called Levittown’s, and 
increased corporate stock ownership as signs of economic stability as evidence of a 
benevolent American capitalistic society (Castillo, 2010). The New York Times 
articulates the premise of people’s capitalism as a propaganda framing of American 
capitalism as a social equalizer (New York Times, 1956b). 
  Yet the most provocative aspect of the American exhibit at the 1958 World Fair 
was its Unfinished Business segment which explicitly highlighted three significant 
American problem areas which addressed urban slums, soil erosion and quite 
controversially, segregation (Osgood, 2006, p.284). According to Osgood (2006) fair 
planners felt that previous silence on the race issue would only play into the hands of 
Soviet propagandists noting one fair architect who wrote,  
[m]aybe the best way to ‘handle’ Little Rock is not to ignore it and distract the 
world with gadgets and appliances, maybe the best way is to try to show the 
miserable events at Little Rock in the long context of the Negro’s rise from 
slavery and his spectacular recent progress (p.284) 
The title, Unfinished Business, was inspired by a quote from Abraham Lincoln’s 
Gettysburg Address which “admitted that America is not yet a perfect society but establish 
the promise that through faith and hard work the problems of man and his environment 
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can be overcome.” (Culman, 1958, p.14). According to Krenn (2006) “the basic premise 
… was to show that the United States was strong enough to admit its problems and second 
that it was trying to solve them” (p. 87). In other words, the Unfinished Business exhibit 
was designed to courageously tackle the American race problem head-on. Beginning with 
the slave trade the exhibit candidly acknowledged the oppressive system which brought 
African people to the United States. Fast forwarding to the conditions experienced during 
the 50s. Since the world was already abreast on the racial tension in the US this strategy 
leveraged the widespread public awareness to challenge existing concerns of attendees. 
Featuring magnified newspaper prints to illustrate issues related to “desegregation, urban 
slums and soil erosion” (Krenn, 1996, p.597). The exhibit was broken up into three 
separate rooms. In room one, attendees were shown photographs, newspaper clippings and 
captions which acknowledged the issues. The second room showed graphs, models and 
displays describing how progress was being made. The final room illustrated the ultimate 
goals of American society in relation to soil erosion, urban slums and segregation (the 
three issues highlighted) (Krenn, 2006, p.87). In the wake of a poorly controlled crisis in 
Little Rock in 1957, the World Fair provided an opportunity to address American race 
relations honestly. In the section on segregation, the caption read “not since the Civil War, 
which freed him and made him a citizen, has the Negro made such strides toward full 
equality as he is making now . . . As a result, the doom of the American caste system is in 
sight.” (Krenn, 1996, p.598). On the international stage USIA was comfortable using 
mythic narratives of hope and progress to quickly acknowledge domestic problems and 
recontextualize them to benefit American prestige. Unfinished Business was an 
unvarnished effort to portray the United States in an honest and balanced manner. Owning 
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up to the strengths and weakness of the nation with powerful vulnerably. Demonstrating 
an example of the integrity of a democratic nation reconciling its imperfection and desire 
for growth.  In addition, charts and photos were used to illustrate the increasing numbers 
of blacks enrolled in college and voting. Captions described the progress occurring in the 
integration of Southern schools and made mention of the increasing black income. Early 
viewings of the unfinished business exhibit by European visitors were praised as “a true 
sign of America's greatness.” (Culman, 1958, p.14). However, indignation from 
conservative American politicians quickly led to the halt of the Unfinished Business 
exhibit for “renovations” which would transform the exhibit into a forum on American 
public health problems. Thus, the most transparent use of American propaganda was 
censored to appease domestic congressional discomfort.  
  According to Osgood (2006) the fact that the USIA reported on any social 
problems at all was a triumph. Acknowledging problems with race relations, urban 
poverty amongst other unfavorable aspects of American life strengthened the credibility of 
the agency. Osgood (2006) notes that USIA  
put a positive spin on the negative images of the United States. In order to 
maintain its message of progress, the USIA always stressed ‘trends’ in its 
propaganda …US propagandists believed the most effective approach to 
controversial issues was to acknowledge their existence so as to assure the world 
that the problems were being addressed (p.286). 
Yet acknowledging that a problem exists and systematically addressing the causes of said 
problems are two different things. Telling half-truths is a dangerous strategy for building 
relationships with the world. In the process of emphasizing a one-sided positive version of 
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reality USIA obscured the negative implications for minority populations in the country. 
Telling an exclusively progressive story without fully grappling with an honest assessment 
of reality for the sake of propaganda risks warping reality for systems dependent on strong 
propaganda. Episodes like the Brussels World Fair would set the tone for the organization 
as it attempted to reconcile the Little Rock crisis in a later documentary produced in 1964 
and various other forms of propaganda created at the behest of US foreign policy interests. 
The Unfinished Business exhibit demonstrated the potential laden in US propaganda when 
issues were addressed in earnest. 
  In regard to the Unfinished Business exhibit, race relations were framed within a 
historical context stretching back to American chattel slave systems. Within this context 
the contemporary problems faced by African-Americans were significantly better than 
those of their ancestors and the conditions were improving on a positive trend towards 
equality. By leveraging international awareness of dismal race relations USIA bolstered 
US prestige by highlighting American problems directly to demonstrate the strength of the 
American system. This logic states that a society that is open enough to acknowledge its 
own issues and publicly state them to the world is deserving of admiration. In effect, the 
tragic elements of American race relations were spun into positive attributes of a societal 
progression aided by the US government. This narrative of American race relations 
innovated overt propaganda on race relations by using white activities to discuss social ills 
in a manner that recognizes problems because for USIA knowing is half the battle.  
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Chapter 3: The Kamikaze Band: USIA’s Jazz Ambassadors 
 
 Technological advances in mass media were harnessed to influence the perception 
of American society. In practice, centralizing information activities under one agency 
allowed USIA to maneuver quickly, optimizing organizational capacities for conducting 
research, producing content and organizing strategic partnerships to enhance America’s 
image abroad. Through the use of television programming, film and radio, USIA 
disseminated state-of-the-art cultural programing anywhere the United States had access. 
In so doing, USIA propagandists leveraged new and old media to frame American race 
relations in flattering ways. One such method involved sending popular jazz ensembles 
around the world as goodwill ambassadors. This chapter will explore the strategic value 
of America’s Jazz Ambassadors within the context of USIA’s civil rights propaganda to 
investigate how the United States Government co-opted jazz, the music of Black life, to 
trumpet American virtues around the world. 
 To tell the story well we must begin by looking at the 2018 PBS documentary The 
Jazz Ambassadors to reflect on the intersection between the Cold War and Civil Rights. 
Contributing to the discourse exploring how the United States government used 
American jazz musicians as cultural ambassadors to challenge racially charged 
propaganda coming from the Soviet Union and to offset the record of American violence. 
This documentary compiles archival film footage, photos, radio clips, and iconic 
performances depicting the Dizzy Gillespie, Dave Brubeck and Louis Armstrong’s tours 
across Africa, Europe, and Asia during the first decade of the Cold War. Consequently, I 
am examining this text because it chronicles the vital intersection between American civil 
rights propaganda and the Civil Rights Movement. Several salient images and texts 
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compiled in the National Archives are not available via online databases , but the film 
reviews these resources while collaborating with first person participants and prominent 
propaganda scholars studying American Cold War propaganda.  
 USIA was determined to demonstrate to the world that America had 
accomplishments in the fields of economic growth, prosperity, military might, political 
strength, moral, and technological advancements. Therefore, from a societal standpoint, 
the American way of life was far superior to that of the Soviets. From a strategic 
standpoint, USIA hoped that audiences around the world would be persuaded by its 
messaging efforts and that those audiences would in turn side with American rather than 
Soviet interest. Although Soviet propagandists exploited America’s racial insecurity by 
contesting narratives of progress and change with images of lynchings, neo-Nazi 
aggression, and Ku Klux Klansmen as integral forces within Jim Crow America. The 
Soviets pointed to systemic issues within American society using images of Klansmen 
and lynchings to demonstrate material evidence of flaws in USIA’s progressive logic. 
Despite frequent exaggeration referenced throughout Soviet propaganda, the messages 
aligned with the information on race relations across various news sources. For example 
in reference to the crisis in Little Rock, the Soviet news outlet Izvestia noted, “[r]ight not 
behind the façade of the so-called ‘American democracy’ a tragedy is unfolding which 
cannot but arouse ire and indignation in the heart of every honest man” (Dudziak, 2000, 
p.121). The article from Izvestia went on to say, 
Fascist thugs of the Ku Klux Klan are organizing a savage hunt for Negro 
children because the latter planned to sit in the same classroom with white boys 
and girls. National Guard soldiers and policemen armed to the teeth barn Negro 
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children from entering the schools, threaten them with bayonets and tear gas 
bombs and encourage hooligans to engage in violence with impunity (Dudziak, 
2000, p.121). 
Meanwhile, beginning in the mid-50s, Soviet propagandists championed slogans calling 
for “peaceful coexistence” across the globe enabling Soviet propaganda to create a 
powerful image of harmony (Cull, 2008, p. 126). This image of harmony framed the 
Soviet way of life as a tempting counteroffer to the American racism and anti-
communism. 
  
In the wake of news coverage covering the brutal lynching of a 14-year-old Emmett Till 
in Money, Mississippi, reports around the world in August of 1955 showcased the 
consequences of whistling at a white woman. The iconic images of Till’s open casket 
illustrated a horrific level of brutality in the United States. The full acquittal of Till’s 
murderers a few weeks later only added insult to injury. At the same time, the Civil 
Rights Movement’s non-violent protest campaigns laid the foundation for the 
Montgomery Bus Boycott during which Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat to a white 
passenger in December of 1955. The international news coverage of these anti-
segregationist episodes and the protests that followed questioned the ability for American 
democracy to uphold justice, especially among African and Asian countries (Von Eschen, 
2004). USIA messages advanced an international imperative to believe in the merits of a 
“benevolent supremacy” (Borstelmann, 2001, p. 86). In other words, America pursued 
ideological hegemony to promote prosperity and sustain international order throughout 
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the Free World. From the intelligence community’s perspective, psychological conflict 
constituted a sort of “total warfare”. According to Osgood (2004)  
[t]he principle of total war – that wars were no longer fought by armies in the 
field, but by the entire nation – erased distinctions between the front line and the 
home front and made the mobilization of the masses an indispensable feature of 
modern conflict (p.1) 
Though in 1955 the US had not technically waged war on any nation. The war of ideas 
was a powerful metaphor which dominated thought in the American foreign policy 
establishment. 
As such, the Soviet threat posed a powerful threat to the American psyche not because 
American soldiers were being shipped by the thousands overseas to participate in military 
conflict. Rather because the American way of life, its institutions, individualism, liberty 
and value system writ large were jeopardized by the organizational structure of another 
powerful empire. The United States desired allegiance of all nations to ensure the 
collapse of Soviet communism However, for this scheme to work, international public 
opinion had to be mobilized into an interwoven global superstructure. In propagandistic 
terms this meant that the superpowers needed to regiment the minds of foreign audiences 
to favor their vision for world order. Now the major international superpowers embraced 
propaganda to enhance prestige and thereby contest the illusions necessary for sustaining 
order in society (Ellul, 1962).  
 Bolstering prestige can be accomplished by cultivating goodwill and friendship. 
Although in the grander scheme of USIA directors, a prestigious version of reality could 
be stereotyped and exported (Sorenson, 1968). The United States recognized that global 
 81 
hegemony required constant posturing in front of the 20th century news media.  Although 
legalized discrimination on the grounds of race made the United States appear 
hypocritical.  due to a ludicrously sluggish pace towards its avowed aspirations of 
freedom and equality for all. The Bus Boycotts generated ripples within a larger torrent 
of active resistance against the corrupt structure of white supremacy in the United States. 
Moreover, the event brought Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s Black freedom movement into 
the purview of an international gaze. Mass communications strategies honed by USIA 
utilized radio waves, books, libraries, and documentaries in addition to forms of cultural 
content to propagate the notion that The Civil Rights Movement was the symbol of 
American progress towards its true ideals and aspirations. In this vision, the struggle 
towards Civil Rights for African-American people was an example of the types of 
reconciliation and positive gradual development which a democratic capitalist system 
supposedly facilitates. Despite the fact that the spirit of the law should have already 
granted them equal rights let alone civil rights in the first place.  
 Convincing emerging nations across Africa and Asia of America’s good 
intentions and bolstering US prestige inherently posed a challenge that required 
innovative solutions. Jim Crow America reminded many African and Asian nations of 
colonialism and imperialism (Dudziak, 2000, p. 58). Legalized segregation complicated 
efforts to say otherwise. Consequently, as radical mechanism to garner goodwill from 
mostly non-white audiences, USIA leveraged jazz music as a powerful pop culture 
weapon in USIA’s Cold War arsenal. America’s action of sending Black musicians in 
racially integrated bands around the Third World would demonstrate the progressive 
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aspect of American society while also emphasizing positive African-Americans 
contributions.  
 Sending jazz musicians as a form of cultural diplomacy presented a high risk/high 
reward dilemma. At the time, in American popular culture jazz was regarded as 
disreputable genre of music with a negative stigma connected to stereotypes about 
African American culture, namely promiscuity, drugs, and crime (Von Eschen, 2004). 
Even more so because Jim Crow society struggled to reconcile its attitudes towards 
African-Americans who were being treated as second-class citizens. However, Adam 
Clayton Powell, an African-American congressman from Harlem, lobbied Eisenhower 
and foreign policy officials convincing them that Jazz presented an optimal instrument 
for American propaganda which could “radically improve America’s image in the non-
white countries of the world” (Berkeley, 2018). If the American government sent Black 
artists abroad, it would strategically showcase a symbolic action signifying tolerance and 
progress in the field of race relations. Eisenhower signed off on the proposal which 
initiated the State Departments jazz tours overseas. Symbolically the decision to use jazz 
as an instrument of American propaganda was savvy for a number of reasons. 
 First, jazz was extremely popular amongst the youth culture throughout numerous 
non-white countries and especially in the culturally repressed Eastern European satellite 
states because the USSR banned the import of Western cultural products (Cull, 2008b). 
Fosler-Lussier (2015) notes how despite an internal bias toward European classical 
music, USIA cultural analyses found that: 
In the early years of U.S. cultural presentations, feedback from the field radically 
changed some of the program’s premises. The rapid decolonization of states 
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formerly ruled by Europeans and elites called attention to the power of the 
masses: the State Department no longer regarded elite audiences as the only 
people worth reaching. At the same time, the embassies sent word that classical 
music simply could not attract the socially and economically heterogeneous 
audiences the department had begun to seek. In hopes of connecting with these 
audiences, officials added jazz, variety shows, and popular music to the classical 
music they preferred. (p. 18) 
Furthermore, on the international scene, jazz music was regarded as cool, hip, and fresh. 
Quoting a report compiled by USIA from 1958 titled “Report on Activities of the 
Cultural Presentation Committee,” Cull (2008), a historian of public diplomacy, argued 
that jazz was “without equal... in appealing to youth groups abroad.” (p. 155). Second, 
USIA recognized that first person contact with Americans was a tremendously powerful 
tool for influence operations. Third, USIA determined that popular African-Americans 
could be solicited to serve as a goodwill ambassadors representing their country and 
dispelling unfavorable ideas about America through the symbolic power of voluntary 
participation. Consequently, public diplomacy was born as an avenue to enhance 
relationships with foreign audiences by facilitating exchanges of people.  According to 
Cull (2008) the term “public diplomacy” was coined in 1956 to describe “a system of 
international communication and intercultural relations that become the subject of an 
international actor’s policy” (p. xvi). This meant that through using the appeal of artists, 
intellectuals, athletes, and significant public figures in America, USIA could expand its 
influence operations while maintaining its steady output of information.  According to 
Von Eschen (2004), USIA’s  
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The Voice of America (VOA) radio broadcasts by Leonard Feather and Willis 
Conover helped to lay the groundwork for the emergence of the jazz ambassadors 
… Conover’s jazz show Music USA, began in 1955 and continued for more than 
three decades (p. 13).  
To increase the audience of VOA programming USIA distributed “hundreds of 
thousands” of transistor radios throughout the Third World to reach new listeners (USIA 
on Radio Distribution as cited in Von Eschen, 2004, p.16). Conover championed jazz 
describing the music as “structurally parallel to the American political system” 
furthermore that the structure symbolically captured the essence of American freedom. 
(Ryan, 1985, p.94). On the Voice of America jazz hour, Conover noted that “jazz 
guarantees each musician complete freedom within a framework of cooperation” 
(Berkeley, 2018). 
 USIA began administering the first jazz ambassador tour and decision to use jazz 
musicians to promote democratic ideals was controversial to say the least. According to 
Von Eschen (2004), “[using jazz for public diplomacy] lacked … support from the 
domestic public opinion of the United States as the idea of releasing a governmental 
budget to promote black musicians abroad caused reluctance within the most 
conservative senators and in addition, segregation was still rampant.” (p. 2). The Soviets 
were relentless in portraying the Unites States as an industrially prolific yet culturally 
inept land of barbarians known for appropriating European culture because it lacked its 
own (Osgood, 2004). This argument stung the American ego and despite all odds, due to 
Congressman Powell’s advocacy, bebop jazz became the perfect remedy for America’s 
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image problems because jazz was truly a unique and modern African-American cultural 
tradition.  
 In addition, the combination of black and white artists collaborating together to 
share jazz music with international audiences became a resonant method of connecting 
with younger audiences around the world. Building relationships through this form of 
public diplomacy engendered lasting positive impressions on the people reached. 
Additionally, the cooperation and comradery displayed between band members 
personified USIA’s progressive American tale. According to Fosler-Lussier (2012) “the 
outlook of cultural diplomacy changed, aiming less to awe foreign publics than to engage 
them. In this environment, the success of musical presentations depended on creating 
meaningful personal contact.” (p.55). Developing rich connections with the people of 
emerging nations was recognized as a vital element of modern world affairs because “the 
long-range influencing of motivations and attitudes in support of long-term national 
objectives” constitutes just one category of propaganda used by nations to influence each 
other (Sorenson, 1965, p. 3). In other words, the US needed to maintain its international 
reputation with other nations which required bolstering relationships with the people who 
constituted those nations.  
 In April of 1955, the first largescale international Afro-Asian “Conference of 
Non-Aligned Nations” was held in Bandung, Indonesia. The conference stated ambitions 
to oppose colonialism or neocolonialism by any nation and promote Afro-Asian 
economic and cultural cooperation (Berkeley, 2018). The United States was not invited 
and assumed that the conference was an assembly of communist adversaries. Moreover, 
participation from Americans would have likely only stoked derision and scorning over 
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the United States’ racial problems and complicity regarding European colonial affairs 
(Krenn, 2006). Although USIA officers were assigned to the event to collect information. 
According to Cull (2008), USIA “turned the conference to modest advantage, largely by 
helping prepare sympathetic delegations and their home audiences for the conference 
[through briefings from public affairs officers]” (p.126). Although a prudent Adam 
Clayton Powell, disregarded the official prohibition on official representation from the 
United States and gained entrance as a journalist on behalf of JET Magazine (Berkeley, 
2018). During Powell’s time at the conference he advocated on behalf of American 
democratic capitalism acknowledging the problems faced by minority groups and 
defending the claim that democracy is the best model for achieving national 
reconciliation.  When interviewed about his rationale for going Powell noted 
I do not hope to represent the American viewpoint as we commonly think of it but 
as a negro member of the United State Congress. I hope to prove to the peoples of 
Asia and Africa that this country has a very large minority of colored peoples 
from Puerto Rico, Mexico and Negro people and by that racial link I think that we 
can establish a bond between our country and their countries which will guarantee 
world peace because no one would dare defy the peoples of Asia Africa and North 
America. (Berkeley, 2018) 
Representing an African-American perspective he presented a case arguing that the 
United States was moving towards Democracy and the America could support an anti-
communist non-aligned movement. Non-alignment was fine so long as it was pursued for 
the right reasons. Upon Powell’s return to the United States he was applauded by fellow 
congressional members and appreciated as a valuable resource with insights into the 
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sentiments of the global south. Powell had advocated for years to employ African-
Americans in USIA’s field staff to “counteract America’s deserved reputation for 
bigotry” (Cull, 2008, p. 98). Due to the success of Powell’s gamble at Bandung and his 
subsequent support of Eisenhower’s reelection campaign he built enough persuasive clout 
to pressure Eisenhower to support his jazz diplomacy initiative. First by employing Dizzy 
Gillespie, Powell’s friend and the world-famous father of bebop, to support the first of 
many State Department sponsored jazz tours throughout nations where the Communist 
threat was regarded as imminent. Dizzy had a history of political activism and when 
prompted to attend pre-tour political briefings from the State Department before 
departing, he noted “I’ve got 300 years of briefing, I know what they’ve [the United 
States] done to us and I’m not going to make any excuses. If they ask me any questions 
I’m going to answer them as honestly as I can” (Berkeley, 2018). Dizzy’s band was 
tactful yet unapologetic regarding their experiences in the United States. In this spirit in 
March of 1956, Gillespie’s band embarked on a ten week tour in South Asia, the Middle 
East, and the Balkans on the first U.S. State Department jazz tour (Von Eschen, 2006, 
p.6). Artists enlisted in cultural presentation programs prioritized the power of friendship 
in international relations and viewed the arts as a powerful catalyst for long-term 
relationship building (Fosler-Lussier, 2015, p. 21). Dizzy prioritized playing for people 
regardless of their status or wealth and rallied against elite nepotistic concerts by giving 
tickets to crowds of people for free to foster an organic sort of outreach (Berkeley, 2018). 
Cultural exchanges foster a form of public diplomacy that vies for favorable public 
opinion through the act of cultivating friendships. Considering the positive implications 
of public diplomacy Cherbo (2009) acknowledged, 
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There are concerted beliefs that if we are to become better citizens of this 
increasingly interconnected planet we must learn to live together with greater 
understanding, respect, and cooperation; that traditional diplomacy attempts to 
promote U.S. democracy and way of life along with military power are 
increasingly becoming limited tools for creating better international relations; and 
that increased intercultural engagements are crucial, if underutilized, tools in the 
creation of a better and more stable world (p. 285). 
This definition of public diplomacy links to USIA’s “propaganda of peace” (Sorenson, 
1965, p.21). Public diplomacy represents one component of a larger concept of 
propaganda and when applied, individuals from culturally diverse places are able to 
recognize a shared humanity that supersedes language, ethnicity and personal histories 
then cooperation and empathy become viable means of negotiating international 
relations. The artists involved in public diplomacy efforts approached their role within 
the Cold War propaganda efforts using a different model of communication from the 
agents of USIA or the members of the State Department.  USIA’s public diplomacy 
initiatives encouraged people to contextualize themselves as one part of a global system 
interjects them into a part of global consciousness. In recognition of interconnected 
consciousness, Stepnisky (2005) highlighted that, “[a]s a particular instance of global 
consciousness, global memory cuts across religious, national, and ethnic boundaries to 
provide a backdrop for everyday activity that captures the common reality of the shared 
human experience of global life” (p.1384). Articulating soft power linkages between 
nations cultivates mutually beneficial relationships. Reflecting on the peace-building 
power of public diplomacy Pwono (2009) acknowledges that, 
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Cultural and public diplomacy could contribute to reconciliation in regions of 
conflict, bringing people together in particular places where diplomatic relations 
are strained or absent, creating opportunities for people-to-people exchanges, and 
stimulating cross-border creativity and collaborations. Cultural discourse could 
bridge differences and be a platform for peace-building, while cultural forms not 
dependent on linguistic requirements could reach out to young people and to 
broader sets of audiences (p. 302). 
In a historical context when American social progress was stifled by the enactment of 
white supremacy, jazz ambassadors played a vital role in international peacemaking and 
civil rights advocacy. By performing on behalf of the State Department, these artists 
challenged narratives of white supremacy invoking the spirit of the African-American 
“Double V” campaigns during WWII, advocating for “victory over aggression, slavery 
and tyranny” at home and abroad (Wynn, 2010, p.40).   
 Dizzy’s band needed to quell tension in non-aligned states which inspired the 22-
year-old arranger, Quincy Jones to dub the group as the “Kamikaze Band… because there 
was conflict of some kind going on in every place [they] visited” (Jones, 2008, para. 3). 
This was especially apparent when the band was unexpectedly flown into Athens, Greece 
to diffuse massive youth anti-American protests culminated in a stoning of the USIA’s 
local outpost.  Tension in Greece swelled after America refused to “back a move in the 
UN to free the island of Cyprus from British rule” (Berkeley, 2018). Almost immediately 
Dizzy’s band was scheduled to play a matinee event for Greek youth and soon headlines 
from Athens proclaimed the “Students drop rocks and roll with Diz” (Berkeley, 2018). 
The engagement happening on an interpersonal level created the conditions for a special 
 90 
affective resonance to enhance goodwill towards America.  Cultivating long-term 
relationships through cultural exchanges was generating positive feedback for USIA and 
the State Department although the news was received universally well. It cost 
approximately $84 thousand to send Dizzy’s band around the world and southern 
democrats and conservative members of congress bemoaned the expenditures allocated 
for sending jazz music overseas as unrepresentative of the United States. Despite, the 
confusion on behalf of some members of congress stifling the development of cultural 
diplomacy the State Department and USIA were convinced to continue and the success of 
the tour enabled hundreds of subsequent programs including artists like Louis Armstrong, 
Dave Brubeck, Benny Goodman, Duke Ellington and many more.   
 While jazz diplomacy was not the first effort in USIA’s cultural offensive against 
the Soviets it did mark a shift in the tide of warfare. During the first three years of 
operations USIA relied on fighting fire with fire, creating press releases, dropping 
leaflets, form planes and using radio broadcast to win hearts and minds. However, the 
Soviets could mimic all of these tactics. Yet, the Soviets built their image around 
European classical styles of art, architecture, dance and music. Consequently, the Soviets 
could not claim jazz or any of the content constituting American modernism.  Utilizing 
an African American cultural product in the midst of the Civil Rights movement 
reinforced the myth of progress. Detracting from the strength of Soviet criticisms against 
race by leveraging creative and positive attributes of Black culture to gain prestige for 
America.   
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Chapter 4: The Nine from Little Rock  
 
 In the Cold War propaganda offensive, ideological dominance was the object 
sought by both the US and the USSR’s information agencies. Winning hearts and minds 
became a cliché for cultural imperialism. Information technology facilitated the rapid 
proliferation of techniques for spreading American values around the world.  As a result, 
USIA used every available means of communication to sell American democracy to the 
world in order to convince international audiences that American democratic capitalism 
was the remedy to oppression and exploitation and a catalyst for upward mobility. These 
ideas were signified with symbols of freedom, liberty and justice. However, the Civil 
Rights movement publicly exposed racial oppression, harassment, and brutality within 
American society, as non-violent protests around the country became sites of racist 
violence. This fact forced USIA to develop innovative techniques to explain American 
racism to international audiences. Ironically, USIA spun Civil Rights crises into 
American success stories, which rationalized American racism. Pro-segregationist 
attitudes and white resistance to integration were cast in the shadow of a progressive 
mythos where racial prejudices were akin to a disease in remission. While African-
Americans organized and engaged in the Civil Rights Movement to fight for 
representation as legitimate citizens in their own country, USIA exploited salient symbols 
from the Civil Rights movement to diminish dissonance spurred by international news 
coverage. A capital example of USIA’s prowess in softening the image of American 
social blunders is evident in the Agency’s 1964 film Nine from Little Rock. 
Consequently, this chapter examines Nine from Little Rock to articulate the how symbols 
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of  the Civil Rights  movement from the Little Rock crisis were co-opted into USIA’s 
films on American race relations.  
 The film was commissioned in 1963 by George Stevens Jr., the head of the USIA. 
The intent for the film was outlined in a memo dated September 1, 1964, which 
according to Amidon intended to demonstrate “America's commitment to the individual 
and justice under the  law and did document the role of the federal government in 
upholding the law protecting minorities, following the Supreme Court decree declaring 
racial segregation in public school education to be unconstitutional” (Amidon,  & Kovac, 
2015, para. 2). According to Amidon & Kovac (2015) “USIA’s target audiences were 
international youth programs and universities that followed concerns in the US” (para. 2). 
Considering the stated purpose of the film, it bears importance to reflect on the historical 
details of the Little Rock crisis.  
 First of all, the Little Rock crisis was the first Civil Rights event that received 
international televisual attention. According to Branch (1988) “the first prolonged 
duration and the military drama of the siege made Little Rock the first on site news 
extravaganza of the modern television era” (p.223). For twenty days the world saw video 
news coverage of armed guardsmen preventing the nine Black kids from entering Central 
High while also creating barriers around belligerent segregationists. The three-week 
spectacle gave international reporters ample time to reach Little Rock, providing 
sensational exposes on America’s racial prejudices as international viewers watched the 
ugliness of segregationists staunchly standing their moral ground behind the pickets day 
in and day out. According to Krenn (2017), “pictures of terrified African-American 
schoolchildren cowering beneath a withering fire of insults spit and thrown objects was 
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splashed all over the front pages of American newspapers – and the foreign media” (p. 
118). Stories favoring Soviet propaganda basically wrote themselves as the United States 
struggled to justify its white supremacy. On September 4, 1957, nine African-American 
students attempted to enroll in Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. However, 
Arkansas’ governor Orval Faubus proclaimed a state of emergency summoning the 
Arkansas National Guard to safeguard segregation. As the nine kids approached the 
towering high school in the beginning of September, armed national guardsmen 
brandished rifles with bayonets to prevent the students from entering the public school. 
This turn of events contradicted the supreme court’s edict from the Brown vs. Board 
decision in 1954. USIA boldly publicized the apparent successes of Brown vs. Board a 
few years prior, which gave the pretense that school desegregation would be a smooth, 
peaceful process across the US. Consequently, Faubus’ “prayerful” decision to uphold 
school segregation dumbfounded international audiences (Dudziak, 2000, p. 116). Thus, 
school desegrgation catapulted to a significant issue capturing the attention of global 
media (Dudziak, 2000). Weeks of news images displaying militias barring nine Black 
kids from successfully integrating Central High School in Arkansas impacted a wide 
audience as television technology enabled international audiences to feel connected to 
news stories like never before. As the world witnessed the prejudices of white supremacy 
unfold in real time, the Civil Rights Movement gained strength, momentum, and 
credibility while America’s image as a tolerant and civil society began to decay. 
Eisenhower was unable to persuade governor Faubus to integrate Central High in Little 
Rock. In response he deployed the 101st Airborne Division of the U.S. Army to protect 
nine African-American teenagers trying to go to school. According to Schewnck (1999) 
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“throughout September 1957, overseas audiences were appalled by the photographs and 
newsreel images of angry whites verbally and physically intimidating African 
Americans” (p.289).  Consequently, the publicity of the segregationist terrorism and 
human rights injustices, the name “Little Rock” became synonymous with American 
racism (Sorenson, 1968, p. 102).  
 After a few years had passed,USIA decided to revisit the Little Rock crisis to put 
the memory into a repackaged narrative for international audiences.  By 1964, when the 
Nine from Little Rock film was released, the USIA was producing a staggering amount of 
media contents around the world. In a news release prepared from the remarks by USIA’s 
first and only African-American director, Carl T. Rowan, the agency boasted of its 
capacity to produce 200 hours of television programming annually for stations in 80 
countries, creating movies in 52 languages, reaching 750 million people a year, 85 
magazines, 20 newspapers and the 10,000 words that go out daily on a wireless file to 
111 posts abroad, 735,000 prints and 220,000 copy negatives, distributing 20 million 
pamphlets, 10 million books a year and producing a comic strip that was alleged to be the 
most widely read feature in the world (Rowan, n.d.). Although, as noted by Rowan, 
“none of these statistics means anything until we know also what it is that USIA is saying 
through these media.” (Rowan, n.d., p. 26). Visual argumentation could reach literate and 
illiterate audiences alike, which boosted the appeal of the new mass mediums of TV and 
film.  According to Cull (2008), Nine from Little Rock “became one of the most 
successful USIA (?) films. It was seen by audiences in ninety-seven countries in 
seventeen languages. In April 1965 it won the Academy Award for best documentary 
short” (p. 235). According to Schwenck-Borrell, (2004), “the film’s main propagandistic 
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purpose was to portray how the strengths of American society lessened African-
Americans motivation to become radicalized, even if they suffered from the society’s 
racist practices” (p.192). By analyzing this text this chapter investigates how publicly 
successful USIA propaganda films depict American racism, federal responses to racial 
integration, American public opinion regarding Little Rock, and the context in which 
Little Rock needs to be evaluated. Given the salience of the crisis in Arkansas it is 
appropriate to investigate the production from USIA since the film was made with seven 
years of hindsight.  
 USIA faced the challenge of telling a nuanced and complex account of America’s 
story which went beyond repetitive positive superlatives.  Rowan’s account, which 
attempted to take a  “rose-colored-glasses approach,”  ultimately proved ineffective at 
molding global opinion because USIA was operating under the pretenses of wartime 
rhetoric (Rowan, n.d., p. 28). The battle for ideological prominence led the third director 
of the Agency, Carl T. Rowan to note that 
 [f]or as long as I can foresee, our country will be involved in an all-out 
ideological struggle. In this contest of impressions and misimpressions, of 
distortions both deliberate and accidental, USIA must be the restorer of focus, the 
provider of the perspective without which our policies and our purpose can never 
be understood. (Rowan, n.d.), p. 28).  
Propaganda is an instrument which can be used by any individual or group. The trick to 
effectively making an impact when engaging propaganda techniques requires 
manipulating information to conform into a favorable narrative that supports the 
legitimacy of the propagandist (Bernays, 1928). In this case, USIA employed film 
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technology to visually portray American weaknesses as strengths to the world. In this 
manner, American international prestige could be sustained or enhanced to the detriment 
of Soviet communism. According to Dudziak (2000), 
In addressing civil rights reform from 1946 through the mid-1960s, the federal 
government engaged in a sustained effort to tell a particular story about race in 
American democracy: the story of progress, story of the triumph of good over evil 
comma the story of US moral superiority. The lesson of this story was always that 
American democracy was a form of government that made the achievement of 
social justice possible, in that Democratic Change, however slow and gradual, 
was superior to dictatorial imposition. The story of race in America, used to 
compare democracy and communism, became an important Cold War narrative. 
(p.13).  
USIA’s films dedicated to Civil Rights prior to the Nine from Little Rock, focused on 
African-American celebrities to flaunt the positive accomplishments of a few to indicate 
the potential opportunities afforded to the Black community more generally. Civil Rights 
was not directly addressed in USIA films until 1963 (under Kennedy’s presidency), 
instead a natural positive progressive trend was strongly implied. The argument basically 
leveraged the talent, skills and intellect of a few famous African-Americans to symbolize 
the progress America was making in regard to race relations.  
 Drawing strength from the Civil Rights movement, the Black Power Movement 
advocated for human rights, freedom, and equitable treatment to further prosocial ideals 
fueling an aggressive liberation struggle. The politicization of black life in America was 
supported by a cultural revolution of sorts whereby black artists and intellectuals were 
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breaking down racist stereotypes that had been haunting the American psyche for years. 
USIA told a progressive story emphasizing the impact of gradualist appeals to social 
change which had benefitted African-Americans post-slavery. In this context, slavery is 
regarded as a blemish on the American record—however, through a process of 
reconciliation and soul-searching, the United States were doing everything in its power to 
reverse the injustices which built its cultural empire.  
 Many of the films produced by USIA were created by USIA field agents who 
collaborated with individuals in the local context in which they worked around the world. 
However, Nine from Little Rock broke away from that model instead contracting Charles 
Guggenheim, a renowned film director and producer, to create a powerful story focused 
on desegregation efforts in Little Rock, Arkansas. Guggenheim’s film “presented racism 
as a local issue being addressed by a benevolent federal government … [concluding] that 
no one knew exactly how many victories there had been for the cause of civil rights, but 
Little Rock had produced nine.” (Cull, 2008b, p. 235). In 1963, Terrence Roberts, 
Thelma Mothershed, Elizabeth Eckford, Ernest Green, Carlotta Walls, Melba Pattillo, 
Minnijean Brown, and Gloria Ray, the  teenagers that constituted the  Little Rock nine 
were emerging adults and USIA decided to follow up with them to illustrate how 
ordinary African-Americans were processing race relations and the Civil Rights 
movement in the US. As noted by Schwenck-Borrell (2004)  
for the first time, a USIA film would focus not on ‘star’ African-Americans, such 
as singer Marian Anderson, diplomat Ralph Bunche, or Olympic track medalist 
Wilma Rudolph, but on African-Americans who had become famous because of 
their role in integrating American society (p.187). 
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The film served as a human-interest story around the Little Rock Nine which brilliantly 
leveraged the interest in the school integration crisis just six years prior while addressing 
foreign audiences concerned by racial violence and protest in the US (Cull, 2008b). In 
this sense the film addresses the present via the past, by following up on the Little Rock 
Nine to see where they are in the present and using their stories as a foil for American 
progress at large. Furthermore, this film would help provide context to international 
audiences regarding how the lives of the Little Rock Nine had evolved since 1957 and to 
capture reflections on their traumatic experiences from six years prior.  Considering that 
the Little Rock Nine broke the color barrier at the previously all-white Central High this 
story demonstrated the normalcy of American public-school desegregation and reinforced 
the positive progressive trend.  According to Schwenck-Borrell (2004),  
during the first few months of the school integration crisis, foreign and domestic 
press tracked the progress of the Little Rock Nine, who appeared in films, 
photographs and interviews to be thoughtful and courageous teenagers. The Little 
Rock Nine’s struggles to achieve their individual goals, despite the nation’s 
racism, spoke to the difficulties emerging and non-aligned nations experienced as 
they sought political autonomy. (p.182) 
This narrative was of great interest to the anticolonial world and USIA aimed to herald 
the US as a beacon of hope. Telling a story where the United States systematically filters 
out prejudices and injustices according to the public opinion of its citizens. In effect the 
Civil Rights Movement demonstrated how enacting organized dissent enabled the 
American government to respond to the political interests of the majority of its 
constituents. 
 99 
 The USIA coopted the Civil Rights movement in order to tell a persuasive story to 
its audiences in the developing world. Their narrative situated the civil rights movement 
within a frame of “perpetual progress.” This narrative became the pillar of USIA’s 
rhetorical strategy for combating the spread of Soviet sponsored communism and other 
forms of socialism. 
The Nine from Little Rock: Textual Analysis 
 The film opens with a suspenseful drumroll. Soon afterwards, the viewer’s eyes 
are greeted by an ominous black and white scene displaying the shadow of a moving 
man. As the camera pans out to follow the movement of the shadow the scene opens up 
revealing the iconic fortress-like silhouette of Central High school. After a quick title 
credits sequence, a handsomely suited Jefferson Thomas, one of the Little Rock Nine, 
emerges from the shadow. As he overlooks the school, which undoubtedly played a 
significant role in his life and within the broader Civil Rights Movement Thomas is 
indicated to be the narrator of the film speaking pensively as he reminisces about the 
significance of not only the school but also his time there. Thomas notes 
Perhaps it is best for those today to look where they are going and not where they 
have been. But when you’re a dark man in a country where the Negro is 
demanding more and more an equal chance, you have the right to look back to 
discover if you are really moving forward, or if the world is just moving beneath 
your feet. (Guggenheim, 1964) 
These lines invite the audience to consider the Civil Rights movement within a broader 
historical context. African-American citizens have demanded equality for a long time and 
the only way to determine how much progress has been made is to take a step back to 
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reflect. In this case, the audience is briefly transported back to 1957 to address the racial 
tension which made Little Rock famous. In the background, a contemplative Thomas 
teleports away from his aloof and reserved suit leaving behind a cool and calm demeanor 
for an agitated and desperate look on his face as he sprints at full speed on Central High’s 
outdoor running track. Thomas breaks away around the track and begins to smile 
indicating a positive trend is beginning. While acknowledging the details of the state 
sanctioned segregationist military actions, the visuals show news reels displaying crowds 
of frenzied white supremacists sneering and harassing the black teenagers as they were 
rejected from Central High day-in and day-out. Thomas proceeds by noting that:  
Hatred is easier to organize than understanding. And there was a minority in our 
state who found it to their advantage to bring hate to Little Rock in 1957. While 
we watched, the white children went to school, and we stood outside. We had 
been taught in school that we were a nation under law. And the law said 
segregation was wrong. Now, we waited to see if our laws had meaning or were 
just words in a book or idle talk in a classroom (Guggenheim, 1964).  
Segregation is framed as a legal issue separate from a moral dilemma. Despite the huge 
psychological connection between morality and the legal system, the film emphasizes the 
Federal government’s integrity in following the law regardless of moral codes. The issue 
of Civil Rights was a contentious topic in America because the nation was culturally 
dismantling white supremacist influence impacting laws in the US. USIA was telling 
America’s story and contextualizing the nation’s biases and stereotypes. Reminding the 
audience that the United States is a nation under law in this context suggests that the legal 
code is only crystallized public opinion in a democratic society. This means that cultural 
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and moral codes populating public opinion in the US are subject to change alongside 
swings in culture, attitudes and stereotypes.  The hatred of white supremacy is framed as 
a bigoted vocal minority in Little Rock. In so doing, the zealous crowd of white 
supremacists was cast as a social anomaly for Americans during this time period. Telling 
the story in this way undermines the American cultural connection to segregation by 
casting American racist stereotypes of African-Americans as influential within a small 
minority of delusional people instead of acknowledging a deeper connection. By framing 
the law and federal government as doing their duty to uphold the constitution the USIA 
film tells the story of progress and process. The supreme court does its job mediating the 
law and the federal government enforces the law. Over time the system corrects itself. As 
a result of the situation in Little Rock, the strength of the American constitution was put 
to the test and the Federal government responded on the side of the law, protecting 
African-American citizens so that they could attend public school in a racially integrated 
fashion. Thomas continues, 
On September 27, 1957, President Eisenhower sent 1,000 men of the United 
States Army to carry out the law. The Supreme Court of the United States had 
said the entire strength of a nation may be used to enforce in any part of the land 
the security of all rights entrusted by the Constitution. And that included my 
rights and the rights of eight other Negro Americans who wanted to go to Central 
High School in Little Rock, Arkansas (Guggenheim, 1964). 
Running gallantly, American paratroopers from the 101st airborne division stormed into 
Little Rock to protect the constitution. The tone shifts dramatically from a brooding score 
to a glorious chorus of horns to accompany the cheerful hero in this situation, the Federal 
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government which used US military power to support truth, justice and the American 
way. Despite the novelty of the situation and the daring of the Little Rock Nine braving 
the tenacity of racial bigotry, Eisenhower’s begrudging decision to call in the troops is 
praised as a valiant decision. National guard patrol wagons escorted the Little Rock Nine 
to their new public school thus ending the memory of the crisis in 1957 to feature the 
progress achieved in the following seven years. A brief mention is given to the 
inevitability of misunderstanding and grief over changing social conventions. Thomas 
makes the argument that “in a town of 100,000 there were many who didn’t like what 
was happening. But as we looked at the soldier, we knew there must be millions of others 
who thought we represented something important” (Guggenheim, 1964). This rhetorical 
framing obscures the racial prejudice internationally understood to be a deeply American 
ideology.  
 Suddenly a bell tolls and seven years rapidly pass allowing the audience to 
shadow six of the nine students as they share their career status, aspirations and hopes for 
the future. Seven of the Little Rock nine are asked to share personal details about the 
colleges they attended and the lessons they learned along the way after leaving Central 
High. For instance, Minnijean describes how she learned about the way the world works 
through her university experience noting  
The things I have learned here have helped me to come to terms with myself. For 
the first time in my life, I have begun to understand why some Americans act the 
way they do. I know now, some Americans have a fear of the Negro, a fear borne 
of a way of life that has been dead in this country since the end of slavery. That’s 
what the mob in Little Rock was afraid of—that the Negro, who had done so 
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much with no chance, might do so much more with an equal one (Guggenheim, 
1964). 
In this way the influence of white supremacy is indirectly acknowledged as a residual 
legacy of American chattel slavery although the implication is that the biases and cultural 
stereotypes of an older time were long gone. Furthermore, the fear of African-Americans 
in this sense is limited to the consequences of equal opportunity instead of the biological 
or psychological stigmas pervading within the American ideological system. However, 
this fear of Black people and the preservation of an existing status quo subjugating 
minorities was washed away to welcome images of a multicultural picnic featuring young 
college students spending quality time together drinking Coca-Cola. Surely, this image 
was more indicative of the conditions of race-relations in America. A multicultural 
melting pot where problems exist but communities are naturally progressing towards 
greater tolerance and understanding. This framing doesn’t acknowledge the role of social 
agitation undergone by the Little Rock Nine or the wider Civil Rights movement. Instead 
the law decided the moral attitudes of its citizenry.  
 Intermittently, as the film revealed the 1964 lives of some of the Little Rock Nine, 
the audience follows Jefferson as he wanders the halls of his alma mater as one of a 
growing minority of Black students in the hallway. This visual of increased African-
American presence in Central High precedes a transition acknowledging how all but one 
of the Nine attended predominately white colleges.  Elizabeth Eckford then takes the 
helm describing how integration impacted her life saying 
If it hadn’t been for that morning in September 1957, I could have gone into law 
or education and not thought much about it. I was frightened that morning. But I 
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learned a great deal about people—not only about the people who were there, but 
about the people who were not there, like the politician who encouraged the mob, 
like the thousands who suffered with me and wrote to me to tell me so. While I 
waited, I heard brave voices speak out against intolerance. And I saw grown men 
turn their heads in shame from a camera (Guggenheim, 1964). 
Choosing not to mention Governor Faubus or any of the other segregationist advocates 
encouraging the mobs gathering in front of Central High deflects the criticism against the 
state officials taking matters into their own hands. In addition, the pro-segregationist 
sentiments and attitudes are juxtaposed as a minority perspective contesting against a 
stronger majority thus the will of the people is framed to be against the against white 
supremacist policies. This articulation helps demonstrate to the international audiences 
that when push comes to shove Americans were going to follow the law and do the right 
thing. “Pockets of discrimination” existed across the US which public opinions was 
shifting to eliminate segregation through a “quiet revolution taking place in America” 
(Guggenheim, 1964).  
 As the film winds down, Jefferson Thomas is brought in to reflect on his personal 
growth since high school and as he reflects on his accomplishments he stares into Central 
High’s trophy showcase driving home the achievements which he alludes to in his 
closing statements. Thomas notes,   
[t]his spring, I take an exam to become a certified public accountant. That means 
I’m supposed to be qualified to keep track of profits and losses. I’m not sure I 
know enough yet to say what all this adds up to. I haven’t counted all the victories 
since that first day we went to school here. But I know there’s been at least nine. 
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In Little Rock, there’s a slow bridge taking shape over that chasm of intolerance 
and ignorance. It’s a bridge that’s going to be built by us and by our children. 
Before it’s finished, we’re going to have our problems. But if Little Rock taught 
nothing more, it taught all Americans that problems can make us better, much 
better (Guggenheim, 1964).  
With this witty note the film wraps up leaving the audience feeling hopeful and excited 
for the future. This documentary posed a positive framework to understand the 
developments made by African-Americans seven years after the crisis in Little Rock. 
Each of the Little Rock Nine worked to combat intolerance and racism. Encouraging 
audiences to reflect on the importance of addressing problems directly in order to make 
society better. The film is not optimistic about the progress of the Little Rock community 
or the broader American society. However, viewers are encouraged to understand the 
Little Rock Nine as models of the typical stories experienced by African-Americans at 
this time considering they constitute the subject of the film. Ending on a positive note, the 
cameras take a few last wide-sweeping views of Central High before revealing a bigger 
skyline with the Arkansas State Capitol building looming in the background, suggesting a 
symbolic link to progressive power of the American democratic system. 
Discussion/Analysis 
 Guggenheim’s documentary was filmed in black and white and ran for twenty 
minutes, emphasizing the dignity of the students hurled into the center of a national 
integration crisis. The film glosses over the incendiary remarks made by the Arkansas 
governor Faubus at the time and neglects to indict the state government’s participation in 
obstructing progress in Civil Rights. This is because racial prejudice was framed as a 
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societal anomaly held by lone wolves or small groups on a local level. This articulation of 
the race relations shifts the blame from a macro societal or systemic issue to a micro 
individual level. In other words, the tree is not poisoned but instead there a just few bad 
apples in the mix.  
 The issue is that USIA had a tremendous platform reaching up to 750 million 
people at this time and the Agency used its platform to tell an uncritical human-interest 
story. The Nine from Little Rock does not tell anybody anything really about the state of 
affairs in the United States in regard to these students in particular or in regard to race 
relations more broadly, which is what this film is designed to discuss in the first 
place. This film was not successful in addressing the Little Rock crisis at all. The 
decision to discuss ordinary African-American citizens impacted by the Civil Rights 
movement was a positive step in sharing American culture with the world. The discussion 
of the Little Rock crisis was sparse and would have required a fresh memory of the 
details of the Little Rock crisis to evaluate the progress achieved in the seven-year time 
gap. Moreover, the film never directly addressed any of the film reel content shown 
throughout. Instead the powerful clips taken in 1957 are reserved as B-roll footage which 
are only used to tangentially connect with USIA’s optimistic future-oriented vision of the 
US. 
 As a work of civil rights propaganda, the film does not address deeper questions 
held by international audiences. The dialog throughout the film possesses a few 
sentimental and impactful moments scattered between vague messages and allusions to 
American racism. USIA operated as an autonomous organ of the US government 
constrained by the public opinion of the nation when creating its content for international 
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audiences. The need to contextualize American culture broadly to explain American 
cultural biases, stereotypes, attitudes, and political which aligned in the careful manner in 
which biases are addressed in the Nine from Little Rock. The agency needed to tell a 
balanced story to the world to demonstrate humility and recognition of American social 
issues, although the film finishes feeling like a missed opportunity. A strange tension 
exists in the film where the concept of racism is alluded to heavily yet explicitly avoided. 
This directorial choice concealed the racialized motives of the segregationist groups 
alluded to in the film while projected the Federal government’s response heroic without 
explaining the significance of its action. Rather the federal government’s response is cast 
as heroic because in principle it affirmed its constitution.  
 USIA was constrained to tell America’s story to the world in a manner that 
weaponized American democracy as an ideology, demonizing other places, spaces, and 
people if they choose not to organize themselves identically to the U.S as evidenced by 
the support of coups across the Third World (Cull, 2008). In the Nine from Little Rock., 
civil rights issues were addressed superficially by tokenizing the Little Rock Nine instead 
of Black celebrities who usually constitute the characters in USIA films. The Civil Rights 
movement disturbed the American status quo and notified all parties paying attention that 
the US needed to modernize its attitudes towards people of color and mend some of its 
generational trauma linked to race, class, and gender. USIA had the reach, resources and 
autonomy to create meaningful content to help build mutually beneficial relationships 
with international publics. However, Nine from Little Rock neglected to address systemic 
issues in the US in nuanced manner.  
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 In the Nine from Little Rock, major historical elements of the narrative are 
individualized  framing the Civil Rights Movement as a story of individual successes. 
This rhetorical choice folds the collective action of activists and social justice coalitions 
into the dominant ideology of American individualism. The film illustrates a bizarre 
relationship between the Little Rock Nine as they revisit the school which traumatized 
them as teenagers in order to help USIA tell a positive progressive story to international 
audiences. In this way USIA could rearticulate the story of the Little Rock Nine in a 
suitable way to sustain a positive image of American progress. The result is an awkward 
film that gives a shallow examination of American racism, federal responses to 
discrimination, and pleas for Civil Rights. Furthermore, the film appears to contain the 
voices of the Little Rock Nine who are visually featured throughout. However, the voices 
in the film were actually dubbed by voice actors because the USIA and Guggenheim 
were concerned that the Arkansas’ accent would be challenging for international 
audiences to understand (Schwenck, 1999).  
 By factoring in the details of the Little Rock crisis USIA’s documentary presented 
a feel-good progressive story to encourage international audiences, especially students, to 
pursue quiet revolutions in thought as opposed to aggressive or militant appeals to 
equality. Although the Nine from Little Rock was perceived as generally positive by 
international audiences, the film left a wide area for improved engagement with its own 









 Chapter 5: The Propaganda Paradox: Key Takeaways on USIA’s Integration 
Propaganda 
 
 The purpose of this discursive analysis was to illuminate how the USIA 
functioned as a propaganda machine on behalf of the United States government at the 
dawn of the Cold War and the Civil Rights Movement. Drawing from literature on 
propaganda, public relations, and public diplomacy, this thesis connects 20th century 
American propaganda to its roots in public relations, communication studies, and 
psychology. Two revolutionary cultural upwellings met at a historical juncture. The Civil 
Rights movement exposed the cultural inertia of white supremacy in America for the 
world to see while American foreign policy makers sought to crystallize a cultural 
hegemony fashioned after American political, cultural, and economic systems. Although 
the cultural and political systems in America were in a state of radical flux as the Cold 
War and the Civil Rights movements affected one another. Thus, as the voice of America 
abroad, USIA was pushed to negotiate the psychological and cultural tensions 
experienced in America for foreign audiences. This intersection inspired me to consider 
how American governmental propaganda articulated race relations to foreign audiences.  
 Analyzing the Unfinished Business exhibit at the Brussels World Fair in 1958, the 
PBS Jazz Ambassadors documentary, and the Nine from Little Rock film as propaganda 
discourse provided insights into the structural elements of mass-mediated industrial 
propaganda. These texts demonstrate how USIA’s peacetime propaganda co-opted and 
weaponized the Civil Rights Movement developing a “large-scale and sophisticated 
counterpropaganda program in which African-Americans were utilized as living symbols 
of America’s commitment to equality and civil rights” (Krenn, 2006, p. 86). The 
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American way of life had to adjust its implicit biases, cultural stereotypes, and attitudes 
formed around the concept of race to envision a new image of the American Dream. Now 
African-Americans had a prominent role in symbolically defending the image of 
America. This new addition to the American cultural epic sought to bolster America’s 
claim for leadership over the free world.  
 The sheer existence of communism was perceived to threaten world peace, order, 
stability, and perhaps most scarily, People’s Capitalism. The dialectical tension generated 
by the two dominant Cold War political forces posed a problem to be solved by 
American ingenuity. As a result, USIA innovated in the field of propaganda science 
developing industrial social engineering techniques alongside technological infrastructure 
to spread the American gospel far and wide. Moreover, USIA cultivated the means to 
scientifically monitor, evaluate, and exploit public opinion to support American foreign 
policy positions. USIA’s Cold War initiative sought cultural hegemony. As such, USIA 
used its propaganda to manipulate the hearts and minds of mass international audiences 
to undermine public faith in its imperial ideological rival. As a component of a larger 
psychological strategy USIA’s civil rights propaganda productions were defensive, 
cohesion-oriented, and optimized to protect the image of America from Soviet 
propaganda.  
 USIA rejected the notion that America was the monstrosity depicted by the 
Soviets or as mischaracterized in the foreign press (Cull, 2008b). In response, USIA 
heralded the merits of the American Dream by endorsing democratic capitalism as 
fundamentally the best economic and political structure available to humanity from its 
individualistic political orientation. With this assumption in mind, USIA appealed to 
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other nations to give power and legitimacy to US cultural and political hegemony in order 
to cultivate an American-led capitalist globalization mission.  
 In regard to Civil Rights, the USIA sang a tune of hopefulness and patience, 
combined these two virtues would undergird the American industrial process towards 
progress. In this case this meant civil rights for African-American citizens although the 
broader messages bolstered the legitimacy of the American exceptionalism in the realms 
of political and cultural systems. Frameworks used to soften the image of the United 
States throughout the campaign for truth functioned as a defensive propaganda strategy 
for the American government as international audiences experienced psychological 
dissonance from the images of brutality from the international press and the generally 
optimistic propaganda USIA produced on Civil Rights. Following is a discussion of the 
major findings and conclusions drawn from this research project, my recommendations 
for American citizens and foreign policy analyses, in addition to a final reflection on this 
study. 
Major Findings 
 First, the methodology and techniques of USIA’s Civil Rights propaganda build 
upon Bernays’ theories on propaganda, especially the engineering of consent. The US 
strived to attain an imperial legitimacy via the consent of the international publics. By 
portraying itself as a benevolent power seeking to bring order to the world, the USIA 
affirmed America’s strength as a political, moral, and economic leader. Crystallizing 
public opinion required softening America’s image as a racist, beneficiary of European 
colonialism.  Given USIA’s function as a weapon for psychological warfare, Bernays’ 
perspective on effective propaganda is invaluable given his tenure contributions 
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advancing the evolution of USIA’s psychological techniques (Bernays, 1928). To be 
abundantly clear, public relations from a Bernaysian perspective is simply applied 
psychology. Bernays took Freud's theories of psychoanalysis and applied them to 
manipulate public opinion across social, cultural and political contexts, usually for 
American private corporations and also for the American government during wartime. 
Democratic republics place sovereignty in their citizens which means that governmental 
power springs from public opinion. Bernays viewed this aspect of American democracy 
to be worrisome because of his belief that large crowds are irrational, docile, and in need 
of intelligent manipulation (Bernays, 1928). As a result, American propagandists building 
on Bernays’ work scientifically engineer public consent by targeting psychological 
vulnerabilities linked to subconscious prejudices, attitudes, desires, aspirations, dreams, 
and hopes. Strengthening faith in the American democratic capitalist system required 
USIA to convince international publics that America’s intentions and reputation were 
good and that the Soviets intentions and reputation were evil. Leveraging race in the Civil 
Rights propaganda helped manage the impressions foreign publics had of the American 
image. African-American people, cultural traditions, and existence broadly were all 
framed as symbolic of the strength of the American system. If former chattel could 
achieve equality in the American society then American system must truly exemplary. 
Civil rights became a theme USIA used to engender consensus-building as a form 
of defensive propaganda. For USIA to sell the American dream to international 
audiences, race-relations were addressed optimistically within a context beginning with 
slavery to demonstrate the progress attained by African-Americans since. This strategy 
was employed in the Unfinished Business exhibit and in the Nine from Little Rock. 
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When asked about race-relations, the jazz ambassadors didn’t measure their progress 
against the backdrop of chattel slavery, instead they earnestly described the conditions 
experienced at that time holistically. The premise of this rhetorical decision encourages 
foreign audiences to respect American humility, appreciate the courage required to 
acknowledge the country’s problems and incites faith in the American system to solve its 
issues. This argument is geared toward bolstering American prestige amongst foreign 
audiences evaluating American cultural and political institutions. 
 Second, USIA’s Civil Rights propaganda relied heavily on a progressive mythos 
structure. USIA needed to procure the co-operation of non-aligned nations and reinforce 
relationships with friendly international powers. National government propaganda 
showing democracy shifting towards a society devoid of racial injustice appeases global 
opinion and satisfied the “myth of progress” (Ellul, 1965, p.42). This progressive mythos 
used positive images of African-Americans to create a comforting image of linear 
progression in American life. Despite the problems and issues faced in America, USIA’s 
Civil Rights propaganda made sure to help foreign audiences envision prosperity in Black 
American life by transforming tragedy into triumph. In the Nine from Little Rock, 
Eisenhower is likened to a Civil Rights hero calling in the National Guard to enforce 
integration. Throughout the cases examined in previous chapters, emphasis is placed on 
the inevitability of social strife and the strength of the American society to withstand 
social adversity. Interestingly, the sources of frustration, rage, and angst experienced by 
African-Americans is barely touched upon in lieu of a happier story in its messaging 
efforts.  
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 Civil Rights propaganda focused on cultural innovation and the narratives told 
about American race relations were positioned alongside cultural discourse on music, art, 
architecture, engineering, consumer goods and design. All of these things comprised 
elements of American culture and were contrasted against the USSR’s traditional 
Eurasian cultural roots. American culture was cast as progressive, modern, and fresh 
while Soviet culture was primitive by comparison. This cold war construct manifested in 
the advancement of modernism as an American cultural trait (Castillo, 2010). 
Championing the developments in consumer goods, industrial advancements, and jazz 
music helped USIA juxtapose the old-world cultural traditions of the USSR with 
flourishing cultural innovations produced in America. At the beginning of the Cold War, 
Soviet propaganda bashed the US for its racial inequality alongside perceived lack of 
cultural ingenuity, USIA retaliated to these claims by coopting symbols from Civil Rights 
Movement to promote a positive image of the US.   
 Third, winning hearts and minds is most impactful with international audiences 
and perhaps best achieved with critical discourse especially when the issues at hand 
address complex problems that require global solutions. In all of the propaganda texts 
examined throughout there was a general trepidation surrounding how to address 
American racism and the propaganda which resulted featured pleasantries without 
acknowledging structural issues. Honest self-reflections through American propaganda 
may result in the development of mutually beneficial relationships. The Unfinished 
Business showcase came the closest to telling a holistic story of America’s racial history. 
Unfortunately, the exhibit was shut down prematurely because it was regarded as too 
offensive to southern congressmen (Cull, 2008b). Although its commentary on race-
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relations shared an honest depiction of race relations which audiences found brave and 
admirable. Bolstering strategic relationships between nations benefits from humility and 
critical self-reflection. The jazz ambassadors and the Unfinished Business exhibit showed 
that authenticity is a valuable soft-power asset which can be cultivated with great success.  
Implications 
 
 During 1953-1965 USIA built an impressive American propaganda machine that, 
in addition to its global reach, also made frequent use of state-of-the-art media, mass-
media technology, and psychological research. Although in my view, USIA was limited 
by its unwillingness to share self-critical stories to its audiences. Instead USIA’s mission 
as an apparatus for psychological warfare favored spinning positive tales far and wide. 
Furthermore, modern public diplomacy or propaganda should be shared with American 
citizens to limit adverse congressional coercion.  In the case of the Brussels World fair, 
congressmen leveraged their power to coerce USIA to be less critical of American issues 
in exchange for better appropriations (Sorenson, 1968). Giving citizens the choice to see 
how their country is portraying itself to foreign countries is a valuable asset in the 
globalized world. Citizens want to have the ability to know what their government is 
doing with taxpayer funds and the transparency allows public diplomacy or propaganda 
agencies to involve more of the American public into American public diplomacy.  The 
resulting content can be used to engage dialogically with a variety of people. Citizens 
engaging with propaganda from their home-countries add meaningful transparency into 
government operations while opening a space for critical discussion. 
Next, American public diplomacy should beware the dangers of propagating false 
binaries to attain soft power credibility. The Cold War dichotomies created a 
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hyperpolarized version of reality where everything was simplified into a binary world. 
However, oversimplifying reality in this way poses medium to long-term threats to 
societal growth by obscuring how citizens are able to process complex relationships 
between groups, states, nations or otherwise. Finally, a note of warning, the term Cold 
War exists to denote a type of conflict which avoids traditional military conflicts like that 
of WWII where the material conditions of a hot war signifying boots on the ground, 
artillery amongst other things. However, the Cold War blurred the lines between peace 
and war creating complex motivations for USIA’s efforts to control foreign public 
opinion in its favor. This resulted in the use of jazz ambassadors to destabilize political 
tension in Greece and the clandestine gray activities which destabilized the 1954 
Guatemalan government (Sorenson, 1968). Both of these cases demonstrate that 
propaganda is a powerful tool which can be applied to strongly affect political and 
cultural structures to achieve a desired end. Thus, when artificial binary lines are drawn 
to demonize others through propaganda, the propanda needs to be investigated. Wars 
fought over ideological differences, cultural differences or ethnic differences need to be 
critically investigated because no matter the category of war there are always casualties 
some of which may be prevented by social vigilance. 
 This project has explored USIA's manipulation of messaging to cover civil rights 
abuses, but the Soviet Union has a long and rich history of suppressing minorities as well. 
In a war of messaging and counter-messaging, future research should examine how 
Russia managed their reputation amidst their own human rights abuses while attacking 
US propaganda. Furthermore, there are offensive modes of propaganda as well which 
USIA engaged in outside of the production for Civil Rights propaganda which adds 
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different layers of complexity to the understanding of American mass-media propaganda 
which should be explored in detail. In a conflict that lasted almost four decades there are 
ample angles and contexts to be explored which will constitute my next steps as a 
researcher of American mass-media propaganda. 
Final Reflection  
 
 Investigating American Cold War government propaganda as expressions of 
foreign policy drove my critique of USIA actions as emblematic of the United States’ 
moral and cultural point of view. The tools and techniques employed by USIA leveraged 
propaganda studies to express foreign policy persuasively with foreign publics. In 
addition to governments, businesses, social movements, advocates of all colors and 
creeds have access to the tools required to galvanize major social change in prosocial and 
antisocial ways. As a result, I believe that it is imperative that people are brought into a 
broader dialogue on propaganda’s role in modern society. USIA was successful because 
it was a centralized and highly resourced organizational effort designed to affect the 
hearts and minds of millions. Its function played a key public relations role for the US 
government during the Cold War giving the Agency the position to share information, 
news, art, literature and culture with the world. Championing cultural diplomacy during 
the Cold War was a powerful way for the US to project soft power abroad and to begin 
dialogue to bridge cultural and ideological chasms between nations. When creating 
propaganda it is important to recognize that it is not necessary to omit harsh realities 
because acknowledgement of issues in society is a crucial step for healing and building 
relationships with others. Telling nuanced stories with the world poses the risk of 
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misinterpretation however the payoff garners greater respect, admiration in addition to 
cultivating the conditions for dialogic international relations to be sustained long-term.  
 The age of American empire is alive and well in the 21st century. Though the 
Soviet Union collapsed almost three decades ago the threat of new cold wars loom large. 
However, the stage has changed dramatically, now through the proliferation of machine 
learning algorithms, social media technology, artificial intelligence and computer drones 
designed to spread discord, the technological and industrial media economies are primed 
to capitalize on the outrage of international audiences. The actors involved are far more 
complex today than during the 20th century Cold War. During that time period the only 
entities with enough capital to reach millions of people were major governments and 
extremely large corporation. Today anyone with access to social media can reach 
millions of people with viral content consequently, in 21st century informational warfare 
between major powers (China, Russia, US, India, etc.) and terrorist organizations threaten 
the societal stability. Though there are many unknowns about the future of propaganda 
and informational warfare, there is ample that scholars can learn by looking back at the 
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